[TimorLesteStudies] UNDP Consultancy: Mid-term Project Evaluation and Planning Mission
Bu V.E. Wilson
bu.wilson at anu.edu.au
Thu Jun 18 10:07:11 EST 2009
Terms of Reference
Project Titles: “Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy” and “Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue”
Position Title: Expert Consultant, Mid-term Project Evaluation and Planning Mission
Mission Duration: Three weeks in Timor-Leste and one week for preparation of final report
Expected starting date: July/August 2009
Duty Station: Dili, Timor-Leste (with extensive travel to the districts)
I. Background information and ProjectS Description
The upheaval of April and May 2006 thrust the country into a socio-political crisis with potentially catastrophic consequences for its future social and economic development. By the time order was restored, the state security institutions had for all intent and purposes collapsed, and the fledgling nation was teetering dangerously on the verge of civil war. Fighting between the army and the police resulted in many casualties. An estimated 145,000 people were displaced with many taking refuge in IDP camps in Dili and throughout the country (70,000 in Dili, more than half of Dili’s population), while an estimated 5,000 houses and buildings were damaged or destroyed in Dili.
The fourth constitutional government was sworn in on 8 august 2007. One of the first acts of the new government was the delineation of three areas of national priority. Two of these related to the resolution of factors affecting national security: the case of the ‘petitioners’ group previously discharged from the army and that of Alfredo Reinaldo and his rebel group. The third was finding a sustainable solution for the displacement problem. Whilst all three priorities have seen significant steps forward, the plight of the displaced population remains a significant area for concern. Finding a sustainable resettlement and reintegration solution constitutes a high priority for the Government and the international community.
Support to the trust-buildIng pillar of the National Recovery Stratgey
The main objective of the programme is to operationalise the trust-building or Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa pillar of the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) and enhance coordination and complementarities among interventions undertaken by different concerned stakeholders.
The Trust-Building pillar forms an essential part of the Government of Timor-Leste’s National Recovery Strategy ‘Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru’, together with the four other pillars (housing, stability, socio-economic development, and social protection) to holistically address the needs of the displaced population and the needs of the wider communities in response to the ongoing effects of the 2006 Crisis.
The UNDP managed AusAid fund was announced at the Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting （TLDPM）in 2008 to support reconciliation and peace building activities. The Fund established a small grants fund to channel funding to 10 Government partner organizations (5 local, 5 international) working in the trust-building arena and provided support to the closely related “Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue” project.
STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS FOR DIALOGUE
A variety of programs and support mechanism were developed by the Government within the framework of the National Recovery Strategy to provide IDPs with viable options for relocation from camps. Central to all of them is the need for dialogue to alleviate the concerns of those who are expected to move and those who are living in the receiving communities, as well as to avoid and mitigate potential conflicts. In doing so it was crucial to adopt an approach that recognizes and utilizes existing government structures whilst supporting them by inserting skilled national teams dedicated to setting up community based dialogue processes. The team of the lead ministry, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), supported by UNDP has set the stage and provided guidance for a community based process that incorporates and strengthens the local level elected government representatives.
The project addresses the development and expansion of existing MSS dialogue teams to cover both Dili and the Districts, strengthening partnerships with local government officials to ensure that the skills and the experience that are developed in mediation and dialogue building remain in the communities, and coordination among different actors involved in the NRS dialogue-building to develop clear guidelines for the implementation of dialogue processes.
II. OBJECTIVES and SCOPE OF THE EXTERNAL EVALUATION
The overall objective of the External Evaluation is to assess at mid-term the results, achievements and constraints of the two projects and to provide recommendations on optimising implementation including future projects’ direction and future UNDP programming in the area.
SCOPE OF WORK
The External Evaluation will review through various methods including field observations, questions to key informants and field officers, focus groups and review of indicators (refr. M&E framework), the achievement of the expected outputs, outcomes, and relative impact on internal displacement and social solidarity through the current projects, as well as the modalities of implementation and execution. Also, the External Evaluation is to provide an overall assessment as to what extent the projects have been successful in achieving or contributing to the overall Country Programme outcome of:
“Basic foundations for post-crisis security, conflict analysis and resolution, and social cohesion strengthened”
In particular, the following categories will be examined (indicative):
· Results status:
1. To what extent was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to the relevant national goals and the UNDP mandate?
2. To what extent the projects have been successful in contributing to the overall impact relating to the displacement challenge in Timor-Leste and social cohesion.
3. To what extent the projects have been successful in contributing to the output of “By 2013, capacity for conflict analysis and transformation, peace and confidence building developed in communities and in Government, including women, along with corresponding coordination mechanisms” (Country Programme Action Plan 2009-2013 Output 8.2).
4. To what extent has the “Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy” achieved its stated objective: to ‘operationalise the trust-building or Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa pillar of the national strategy and enhance coordination and complementarities among interventions undertaken by different concerned stakeholders’
5. Whether the “Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanism for Dialogue” has achieved its four objectives namely:
Managing Conflicts at the local level through interaction with State officials at all levels, with dedicated staff to follow through on the conclusions reached during that interaction;
Strengthening the public perception of State institutions by bringing them closer to the people through real and constructive dialogue with local communities resulting in concrete action;
Strengthening the public perception of local level authorities (such as suco councils and chiefs, district administrators, sub-district administrators, local level public servants, etc) by having them publicly empowered by national level State authorities;
Promoting a common sense of Timorese identity rooted in its rich cultural traditions, history and shared values.
6. To what extent UNDP assistance, channeled through these projects, has resulted in the development of capacity within the Ministry of Social Solidarity and beneficiary NGOs to support the implementation of the National Recovery Strategy. And are these results sustainable?
· Project management and implementation issues:
- Whether the current project management structure, processes and staffing are effective and efficient;
- To identify gaps and opportunities in strategy and tactics in the planning and implementation stages;
- Identification of possible obstacles to effective implementation in the future and recommendations for addressing them.
· Analysis of underlying factors:
- Identification of factors beyond UNDP’s control that influence the project environment and results;
- Risk analysis (short, medium and long term), including those listed in the risk log.
· UNDP contribution:
- Whether UNDP’s interventions can be credibly linked to the achievement of the results as indicated in the NRS (including the outputs, programmes, projects, and soft and hard assistance that contributed to the results)
· Partnership strategy:
- An assessment of the UNDP and MSS partnership along with recommendations for improvement.
- Whether UNDP and MSS’s partnership strategy with INGOs, local NGOs and international organisations has been appropriate and effective along with recommendations for improvement.
- The level of participation of stakeholders / partners in the achievement of the project outcomes, as well as the effectiveness of such participation.
- Efficiency of coordination systems established for return on information and peer review among various stakeholders involved.
III. EXPECTED OUTPUTS
1. Executive summary and preliminary report: The consultant will present a summary of evaluation conclusions and preliminary recommendations at a debriefing meeting with relevant stakeholders. This meeting will be organised by the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit to share the preliminary recommendations and receive feedback from development partners.
2. Evaluation Report: The consultant will submit an evaluation report on the “Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy” and “Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue” Projects highlighting: achievements, constraints, lessons learned and corrective measures where required for the remainder of the project, as well as recommendations for ensuring sustainability and smooth exit/ handover to MSS.
The final report incorporating stakeholders’ comments shall be submitted by the consultant no later than one week after the end of the in-country mission. The consultants should follow the ‘table of contents’ laid out below detailing the minimum reporting requirements for the final report.
The mid-term evaluation report shall follow the structure as following:
Evaluation Report Format:
The Evaluation Report should contain the following:
§ Title Page
§ List of acronyms and abbreviations
§ Table of contents, including list of annexes
§ Executive Summary
§ Introduction: background and context of the programme
§ Description of the programme – its logic theory, results framework and external factors likely to affect success
§ Purpose of the evaluation
§ Key questions and scope of the evaluation with information on limitations and de-limitations
§ Approach and methodology
§ Summary and explanation of findings and interpretations
§ Lessons, generalizations, alternatives
To achieve these outputs the following duties are to be undertaken by the evaluation mission:
1. Review existing documentation: The consultant will conduct review of documents related to the project including the project document, quarterly and annual reports, monitoring and evaluation reports, steering committee minutes and other relevant reports and briefing notes. This documentation will be made available to mission members prior to their deployment to Timor-Leste.
2. Draft evaluation methodology: The consultant will present the Mission’s evaluation methodology to stakeholders at the start of the evaluation mission.
3. Meetings with different stakeholders
· The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit will brief the Consultant e indivdualo eon arrival and provide all necessary details and clarifications on the documents made available for the desk review.
· The consultant will hold meetings with:
- UNDP senior management (briefing/ debriefing);
- Relevant Government representatives including the Minister of Social Solidarity, the Minister for State Administration and Territorial Management, the Secretary of State for Natural Disasters and Social Assistance, the Secretaries of State for Defence and Security, the Director of Social Assistance and the Director of Land and Property.
- The Head of the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit;
- Project staff and Programme Officer of both projects;
- Each of the partner organizations represented on the Project Management Boards;
- All grantees granted sub-grants under the “Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy” project;
- Members of the dialogue teams;
- Donors to the project;
- Beneficiaries of the sub-grants under the “Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy” project; and the work of the dialogue teams
- Any other stakeholders the consultant determines to be important to their evaluation.
4. Consultation on draft report and recommendations: This will be presented shortly before the evaluation period ends and stakeholder feedback will be incorporated into the final report.
5. Submission of mid-term evaluation report: The final reports will be submitted to UNDP one week after the stakeholders meeting at the end of the mission.
V. TIME FRAME AND MISSION COMPOSITION
The mid-term evaluation mission will take place in July 2009 and will be for a term of four weeks, three of which will be spent in Timor-Leste and one will be allocated to the writing of the final report.
The preliminary report and executive summary will be ready shortly before the end of the first three weeks for presentation and consultation with relevant stakeholders.
No later than one week after, the Final Evaluation Report must be finalized and submitted to UNDP.
Qualifications of Expert Consultant
Relevant background and experience in evaluation of UNDP Programming as well as familiarity with UNDP mechanisms and procedures.
Master’s Degree in political science, international relations, development, monitoring and evaluation or any other relevant discipline ;
Minimum three years of overseas experience in the areas of social reintegration and / or crises prevention and recovery, preferably in a post-conflict / development context;
Familiarity with issues relevant to CPR programming in a post-conflict context;
o Knowledge of and experience with M&E mechanisms;
Excellence in both written and conversational English;
Ability to communicate in at least one of the following languages is an asset: Portuguese, Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia;
Initiative, ability to work independently, sound judgment and excellent interpersonal skills;
Experience and knowledge of the socio-political context of Timor-Leste would be a significant asset.
Evaluator shall be independent, meaning that they have not been involved in the design, implementation or monitoring of the programmes or projects to be evaluated.
VI. REPORTING AND MISSION SUPPORT
The incumbent will perform an external and independent evaluation. Reporting in terms of organizational and functional arrangements as well as preliminary conclusions will be made in first hand to UNDP Senior Management through the Assistant Resident Representative/ Head of Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit.
The CPR unit, together with the projects teams, will provide support as requested. Transport for official purposes will be provided by UNDP, which will also make a translator / interpreter available to the mission if necessary.
Interested candidates are invited to submit their applications together with Curriculum Vitae (CV), P11, financial proposal (proposed rate per day and other costs for carrying out this SSA consultancy assignment), contact of 3 referees and relevant supporting documents to the following address:
UN House, Caicoli Street
Email: ssa.tp at undp.org
Copy to pedro.guterres at undp.org; simon.poppelwell at undp.org; and ayako.higuchi at undp.org
The deadline for submitting applications is 28th June 2009.
Only short-listed candidates will be notified.
Women candidates are strongly encouraged to apply.
The upheaval of April and May 2006 thrust the country into a socio-political crisis with potentially catastrophic consequences for its future social and economic development. Long simmering tensions and divisions, some of which pre-date the Portuguese colonisation of Timor-Leste, the subsequent Indonesian occupation and the struggle for independence, gave rise to open conflict triggered by the dismissal of close to 40% of the defence force. By the time order was restored, the state security institutions had for all intent and purposes collapsed, and the fledgling nation was teetering dangerously on the verge of civil war. Fighting between the army and the police resulted in many casualties. An estimated 145,000 people were displaced with many taking refuge in IDP camps in Dili and throughout the country (70,000 in Dili, more than half of Dili’s population), while an estimated 5,000 houses and buildings were damaged or destroyed in Dili.
The presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2007 in a free and fair manner, although further conflict between politically aligned groups triggered significant displacement in Ermera in the wake of the Presidential elections and again in Viqueque after the Parliamentary elections.
The Fourth Constitutional Government was sworn in on 8 August 2007. One of the first acts of the new Government was the delineation of three areas of national priority. Two of these related to the resolution of factors affecting national security: the case of the ‘petitioners’ group previously discharged from the army and that of Alfredo Reinaldo and his rebel group. The third was finding a sustainable solution for the displacement problem. Whilst all three priorities have seen significant steps forward, the plight of the displaced population remains a significant area for concern. Peace remains fragile with recurring violent incidents as witnessed in 2006 and 2007. The armed attacks on the President and the Prime Minister in February 2008 further underscored the fragility of the nation.
As of April 2008 approximately 30,000 IDPs remained in camps with the majority in the nation’s capital Dili. Recent government estimates suggest that at least the same volume are displaced and living with host families. Through the successful implementation of the Government’s Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru National Recovery Strategy, adopted in December 2007, more than 1,090 IDP families have returned to their homes. As past experience shows, their successful resettlement and reintegration requires not only a range of assistance packages but also a process that can pave the way for repairing the community relations strained in the aftermath of the 2006 Crisis.
Finding a sustainable resettlement and reintegration solution constitutes a high priority for the Government and the international community. It is broadly agreed that addressing the set of interlinked social, political, and economic factors associated with displacement is a prerequisite for political stability, sustainable recovery and national reconstruction. Accordingly, Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru, is comprised of 5 pillars (housing, stability, socio-economic development, trust-building and social protection), in a concerted strategy that aims to meet the needs of the displaced population as well as the wider communities into which they will be (re)integrating. To support this process a Transitional Strategy and Appeal (TSA) was launched during the Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting (TLDPM) on 29 March 2008 to bridge public funding gaps and support (1) remaining humanitarian needs, (2) implementation of the National Recovery Strategy, and (3) disaster risk management.
At the TLDPM 2008 the Australian Aid Programme committed AU$1.5 million through the UNDP to support pillar 5 of the National Recovery Strategy, Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa, including working with the MSS to promote dialogue between relevant government ministries, local receiving communities and returning IDPs. Other pillars of the NRS are being funded and implemented by other partners.
 As part of its broader mission to enable sustainable social and economic development, UNDP has been given a clear mandate by the United Nations General Assembly to operate in “special development situations”, where disasters and violent conflicts have undermined the human, social, physical and institutional capital that underpin development. In addition, the Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA acknowledged that the increased incidence and risk of violent conflict and natural disaster in programme countries indicates that the demand for UNDP’s services in crisis and post-crisis (CPC) environments is also increasing.
 This list is not exhaustive and should be added to by the consultant. The Mission may use a variety of methods, including one-on-one or group interviews, questionnaires, field visits, focus groups and review of indicators (refr. M&E framework), etc. The Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit will be responsible for arranging the meetings mentioned above and additional meetings required will be organized directly by the consultant.
 Recent reports from CRS, the principal NGO working with camp populations in Baucau, the only other location of recognized IDP camps, estimates the total number there to be around 1000.
 MSS figures provided as of the 23rd April 2008
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