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href="http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCVol4No3/vol4no3Fernandes.html">http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCVol4No3/vol4no3Fernandes.html</A></DIV>
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<P class="style22 style10" align=left><STRONG><FONT size=4><FONT
color=#1a6637><SPAN class=style25>The Road to INTERFET: Bringing the Politics
Back In<BR></SPAN><BR></FONT></FONT></STRONG><SPAN class=style10><FONT
size=2><STRONG>Author:</STRONG> Clinton Fernandes<BR><BR>Volume 4, Number 3
(Spring 2008), pp. 83-98.</FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class="style22 style10" align=justify><SPAN class="style10 style23"><SPAN
class=style24><STRONG><FONT color=#1a6637><SPAN
class=style27>Abstract</SPAN><BR><BR></FONT></STRONG></SPAN></SPAN><SPAN
class="style10 style23"><FONT size=2>This article examines Australia’s strategic
policy during the 1999 East Timor crisis. Written as a stand-alone piece, it is
in some ways a broad counter-point to the essay by Professor Hugh White in the
Autumn 2008 issue of Security Challenges. The author, who was Principal Analyst
(East Timor) for the Australian Intelligence Corps in 1998 and 1999, argues that
the Australian government was not ambivalent about a peacekeeping force; rather,
it worked assiduously to prevent such a force. It demonstrates the need for
strategic actors to incorporate the rough-and-tumble of domestic politics and
public opinion into their sometimes bureaucratic, anaemic calculations.
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