



Cape Verde's NSDSC: Adapting to a crude reality

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When Cape Verdean Defense Minister Cristina Lima attended the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Gathering on November 10th, she had some particular news to share with her Lusophone peers. Indeed, fresh from the meeting with the country's National Defense High Council (NDHC) six days earlier, she was now in a position to showcase Cape Verde's newly sanctioned National Security and Defense Strategic Concept (NSDSC).

Retrospectively, the conceptual process of this document can be traced back to 2004/2005, when the Concept's Grand Options were initially formulated, seeking to present the defining principles in this matter. The public and political debate would then take a few more years until the Council of Ministers approved a first version in 2009 and immediately forwarded it to the NDHC. This consulting body's approval was one of

the last formal steps remaining and is therefore highly expected to result in the final approval of the NSDSC by an upcoming Cabinet meeting.

In truth, the need for such strategic guidelines has become simply undeniable. In light of Cape Verde's growing development – in the context of the remaining African continent – new/old threats increasingly began to represent greater challenges to the peaceful and steady road chosen by the local government. While economic successes and national stability help win worldwide praise and the focus of the international community, they also further reinforce the demand for a comprehensive and official approach that tackles certain security issues which can derail such achievements.

In order to precisely address these issues, the NSDSC initially embarks on a full analysis of the surrounding international context, identifying important factors in the country's national interests: increasing globalization, the relevance of multilateral organizations, instability in some parts of Western Africa, the energetic supply/demand cycle and even the potential for AFRICOM in the region, to name just a few.

After a detailed assessment of the country's internal situation, the NSDSC then focuses on the main perils that Cape Verde faces, in terms of its geographic location. More importantly, it recognizes that

“the dispersion of islands through an extensive oceanic surface, the length of the coastline and the size of territorial waters makes it easy for the practice of transnational felonies and related crimes”.

However, the country also admits that such problems can only be addressed through an effective and active participation of Cape Verde within the international community – referring the need for a “cooperative vision of security and defense” – thus granting national foreign policy a prominent role in Cape Verde's strategy, in charge of fostering partnerships that can, for example, overcome local logistical limitations.

Likewise, “sovereignty”, “territorial space”, “national cohesion” – including the enduring links with the Cape Verdean community around the world – and “universal/national values” are identified as the cornerstones of this Concept. But it is in the definition of the spaces of strategic interest that Cape Verde's ‘tri-continental bridging ambition’ best manifests itself.

Indeed, the NSDSC pinpoints as primary areas both the Atlantic – Cape Verde should consider a role within organizations focused on this particular Ocean and that support the “defense of Peace and cooperation between countries” – and the West-African region, with particular emphasis on Senegal, Mauritania,



Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Gambia, Angola, South Africa and, naturally, ECOWAS. Moreover, the document gives equal priority to the historic connections with Portugal and Europe, to greater technical-military cooperation between CPLP members and to good-terms with both Brazil and the US. Additionally, it explicitly recognizes Japan - as well as China - as likely strategic partners in the near future.

As for relevant threats to the state's security, the NSDSC indicates that every possible "aggression" aimed at "energy, transportation, communication, supply and information networks" should be taken under consideration, with an identical focus on such issues as "drugs, arms and people trafficking and organized crime" and "terrorism". However, it also singles out two traditionally overlooked topics in the neighboring region. On one hand, it cites the need to properly respond to "catastrophes and calamities", including pollution and public health crises - the dengue fever of 2009 is a constant reminder; on the other, it considers it imperative to actively avoid the "proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs", always in close proximity with the international community.

But even the NSDSC recognizes that the resources available are just too scarce and that the interests and dangers to the country's security are simply too vast to allow the simultaneous pursuit of such objectives. In that sense, it is realistic to the point of declaring that, at the end of the day, "it should be given greater priority to fighting crime and delinquency, monitoring and controlling maritime territory as well as prevention capabilities".

Overall, this document creates a number of coherent and defined guidelines for Cape Verde's security and defense policies in the coming years. Given other local efforts - Armed Forces reform, for example -, it is clear that the NSDSC acknowledges the country's growing

foreign gravitas and abides by the prevailing international law, while providing national awareness to the existing regional perils, with destabilizing potential. Although significantly widespread, the sum of geographic interests also ends up representing an accurate analysis of Cape Verde's preferential ties abroad, signaling its present connections with multiple external partners in several continents even further.

Indeed, it is safe to say that for the time being, the NSDSC provides Cape Verde with an updated and modern insight into the security challenges/obstacles in its development path. The only doubt remaining is if the country will be able to translate these words into deeds. Now that the major threats have been identified and a governmental response has been drafted, it is time to actually engage the crude security reality that looms over Cape Verde's horizon.

Mega-projects, pollution, and divergent development models in Mozambique

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In the international aid community, Mozambique has generally been seen as a success story, an example of a country that has risen like a phoenix from the ashes of its civil war to enjoy consistently higher than average gross domestic product (GDP) growth. However, there have also long been criticisms of the glowing reports from the Bretton Woods institutions and others about Mozambique's

growth pattern. Most notably, Joseph Hanlon has frequently argued that the benefits of the growing Mozambican GDP have accrued mainly to a small elite, increasing the inequality between those at the top and the country's impoverished majority. Questions about the development paradigm ascribed to by the Frelimo government have risen to the fore again in Mozambique with increased domestic scrutiny of the government's endorsement and encouragement of development 'mega-projects'.

On November 24, during a presentation to the Mozambican Parliament, Minister of Planning and Development Aiuba Cureneia was asked by members of the opposition *Movimento Democrático de Moçambique* (MDM) about the tax and other benefits to the country provided by mega-projects. Cureneia replied with a ringing endorsement of the nine investments classified as mega-projects, arguing that they have brought new jobs, increased foreign trade, and made Mozambique more attractive for further foreign investment. Cureneia did not respond in specifics to the MDM query on tax revenues, stating only that in order to create incentives for investment, the projects have been granted exemptions from customs duties and from paying Value Added Tax (VAT) on imported equipment, with other conditions varying by project.

One mega-project cited by Cureneia as a success was the Mozal aluminum smelter, located in Matola on the outskirts of Maputo. The first of the mega-projects, work on Mozal began in 1997. While the project has created 1400 to 1500 permanent jobs, Cureneia neglected to mention that one-third of these jobs are held by foreigners. Further, the Mozal project remains under the control of Anglo-Australian mining giant BHP Billiton, which is more concerned with taking profits out of Mozambique than with providing benefits to the country.

Cureneia's strong endorsement of Mozal comes at a time when the smelter is under fire from opposition



groups, NGOs, and environmentalists over its decision to continue operations while replacing its Fume Treatment Centres (FTCs). During the replacement, which is expected to take four months and a half, fumes from the plant are bypassing the FTCs and being emitted into the air unfiltered, exposing residents of Matola and surrounding areas, including the capital, to a dangerous cocktail of dust, tars, and compounds such as hydrofluoric acid and sulphur dioxide. The Frelimo government and BHP Billiton have defended the bypass program, citing consultant and government reports finding no significant adverse health and environmental impacts, findings deemed laughable by local groups who filed a court action to reverse the government approval of the bypass. That this case is still pending did not stop Mozal from beginning the FTC replacement and emitting unfiltered fumes.

The problems with Mozal's emissions highlight a larger issue with the character of development in Mozambique. It is true that mega-projects like Mozal have increased GDP growth, helped Mozambique's trade balance, and improved the national infrastructure. However, the benefits of this have largely not been felt by the poor of Mozambique. Foreign investment can be good for the population of Mozambique as a whole, but not when there is no transfer of skills due to the hiring of high numbers of foreign workers and not when the health and safety of the Mozambican people and environment are disregarded in the name of foreign profits.

Around the same time that Mozal began its emissions bypass, *The Independent* of London published a photo essay about a rural development program on the Zambezi floodplains, funded by the British government and run by Save the Children. The program helps residents adapt to increasingly erratic weather patterns by providing local farmers' associations with livestock, irrigation

projects, and training in agriculture and setting up sustainable small businesses. This program builds local expertise, encourages community entrepreneurship, and gives poor Mozambicans a sustainable means of subsistence over which they have control.

Mozambique may develop in two ways. First, it can continue to seek foreign direct investment through mega-projects that exploit its mineral and hydrocarbon resources, projects that leave control in the hands of foreign corporations for whom the health of Mozambique's people and environment are an afterthought. Alternatively, smaller scale projects can be pursued which put to use Mozambique's human capital and vast tracts of unused land in an environmentally and economically sustainable manner that increases both employment and food security. The first model maintains the status quo of a Mozambique that is "growing" economically without truly developing; the second model may not bring growth in the neoliberal sense, but it will provide ordinary Mozambicans with skills, sustenance, agency, and a more secure future.

Timor Leste: The frontline in Australia's 'boat' policy?

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In an attempt to control the flow of immigration and stop the people-smuggling industry arriving to her country, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard proposed to establish an asylum-processing center in

Timor Leste. The project has been contested by the Australian and Timorese opposition parties and by several human rights advocate groups. Although there has been no comprehensive explanation of the project by the Australian government, the Timorese leadership remains open to discussing the topic, as long as it involves the Bali Process – a group of 47 countries that coordinate efforts in order to stop the "illegal boat arrivals run by people smuggling operations in the Asia-Pacific region". Although the amount of refugees and asylum seekers trying to reach Australia is of significant importance, the way in which the center is expected to be implemented raises not only serious questions about its feasibility and international ethics, but also complex problems for Timorese society, which has no visible need for a center to process refugees.

Firstly, it all stems from Australia's efforts to stop migration flows to its territory. Although the country signed the United Nations' 1951 Refugee Convention, being tough on immigration is a matter that holds great political capital, one frequently used by politicians to score points with the public, especially ahead of elections. On the other hand, using poor countries in south-east Asia and the Pacific like Timor Leste, Papua New-Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Nauru as buffer zones between migration routes and Australia serves the latter's interests greatly, while undermining the internal stability of these countries. Nevertheless, due to gaps in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which does not provide a monitoring mechanism to examine whether countries are abiding to its clauses, Australia is left to freely conduct its own refugee policy, thus escaping its responsibilities as stated in the convention.

Secondly, it is important to understand whether or not Timor Leste has a solid infrastructure to serve as a temporary host country to thousands of asylum seekers and refugees, whose ultimate goal is to reach Australian



land. Since its independence in 2002, Timor Leste has been deeply involved in solving several of its domestic issues, including poverty and criminality. More importantly, it still needs foreign security forces to assure order, security and the rule of law, as it is unable to provide security to its people by itself. Accordingly, the Portuguese Republican Guard (GNR) has been helping the Timorese government guarantee security for roughly ten years now.

Finally, despite oil revenues, the Timorese economy remains in shambles. Its high rates of unemployment alone serve to demonstrate the lack of conditions in the country to receive asylum seekers and refugees. There is a 40% unemployment rate among those aged 15 to 29. This creates low expectations to find employment, which consequently stems poverty and criminality, a situation the government is finding increasingly difficult to address.

All of this data serves as an indication of Timor Leste's serious lack of conditions to host this center. Even if the processing center serves only as temporary quarters to potential migrants, there is no guarantee Australia will stand behind to absorb everyone in its society, nor is there any clue about who will pay for the maintenance of the center or support the costs of repatriation if necessary. Consequently, there emerges the risk that the center may turn into a prison of sorts on Timorese territory, an outcome its government should consider at all times.

The regional view must also be accounted for, especially Indonesia's position regarding the processing center. President Susilo Yudhoyono stated that Indonesia and Australia could discuss the possibility of establishing an asylum seeker center that includes Timor Leste. Yet, the president wants to discuss the idea within the Bali Process framework, which helps coordinate efforts to combat illegal migration but does not have a mandate to decide upon the

implementation of the center, which might just be president Yudhoyono's attempt to oppose its deployment, by dragging the process indefinitely. Indonesia's suspicion is fuelled by the fear of a spillover of migrants from the center to its territory. Weak security in the porous borders between Indonesia and Timor Leste will enable refugees to enter the former via Timor without any kind of detection or registration. Although the center could be implemented in the Timorese islands of Atauro and Jaco, or even in the exclave of Oecusse, which would spur even greater opposition from Indonesia, there is still no evidence that it could be located outside Timor's mainland. Due to Timor Leste's many domestic challenges, Indonesia is worried that the country will be unable to assure the proper functioning of the center, the responsibility of allocating and accommodating the migrants falling ultimately upon Indonesia without any support from Australia. Moreover, Indonesia has already had to accommodate and support approximately 300.000 Timorese refugees who fled to its territory in 1999, following the anti-independence Timorese militia's campaign of scorched earth. Even today, some of them are still refusing repatriation. While Australia is pushing for the implementation of the processing center, it fails to take into consideration Timor Leste's inner frailties, while taking advantage of its young statehood and willingness to be a friendly neighbor to the countries in the region. Timorese leaders must be aware of all the perils attached to this refugee-processing center. They must not succumb to the regional power's wishes unless certain conditions are met and agreed upon, not only with Australia but also with Indonesia, within the Bali Process framework.



The Macau Forum: China's charm offensive for Lusophone countries

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The 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries (PSC) – hereinafter the Macau Forum – held in Macau on November 18th-19th, took the Sino-Lusophone cooperation to new heights. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who presided over the opening ceremony, delivered a speech in line with Beijing's diplomatic charm offensive: a US\$1 billion development fund, a 1.6 billion Yuan credit line, cooperation in human resources training, medical equipment and lofty words that pleased Portuguese-speaking officials.

Moreover, the Forum boosts the symbolic role of Macau, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, as a platform for China's relations with the Portuguese-speaking world. Attending the conference were for the first time three Lusophone chiefs of government (from Portugal, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique) and one head of state, José Ramos-Horta, President of Timor Leste. Also, for the first time, a Chinese Premier joined the ministerial conference, following Vice Premier Wu Yi in 2003 and Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai in 2006.

Seven years after its inception, the Macau Forum has been a complementary instrument in China's foreign policy, adding a multilateral dimension to Beijing's pre-existing bilateral ties with each one of the Lusophone nations. Seven out of the eight Portuguese-speaking countries take part in this initiative - São Tomé and Príncipe is excluded because of its relations with Taiwan. After years of not-much-more-than-rhetoric, the Macau Forum is apparently about to make a leap forward, taking into account the proposals rolled out by Wen Jiabao. Trade continues to be the cornerstone of economic relations. Since 2003, trade between China and Portuguese-speaking countries has logged a seven-fold increase. In his speech, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao set the target of reaching US\$100 billion in 2013 – a goal not that hard to achieve given that in the first nine months of 2010 alone, trade reached US\$68 billion.

But the main purpose of this year's ministerial conference was to go beyond the Sino-Lusophone 'shopping spree',

focusing on investment and engaging more private companies. The theme of the meeting – "Diversified Cooperation, Harmonious Development" – mirrored a very Chinese approach to Sino-Lusophone cooperation. The Macau Forum follows the footsteps of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), launched in 2000. It is noteworthy to stress that just a few days after the ministerial conference in Macau, China's Vice President and heir apparent to Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, kicked off a tour of Africa that took him to South Africa, Angola and Botswana,¹ where China signaled its intention of reinforcing the role of FOCAC, after two years of holding a lower profile. Following Xi's visit to Luanda, China and Angola announced that they had decided to establish a strategic partnership to continue shoring up bilateral cooperation.

And just one week before the Macau Forum conference, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France and Portugal, two European nations with whom Beijing has established comprehensive strategic partnerships. In Lisbon, Hu promised to lend China's hand to Portugal's struggling economy. In Lisbon, Portuguese and Chinese companies made deals and signed contracts concerning infrastructure, renewable energy and tourism worth US\$1 billion.²

This signals a coordinated effort by China's top leadership to give face to two out of the three top PSC partners: Portugal and Angola. The relations with China's major Lusophone partner, Brazil, are dealt with at different level. Furthermore, Brazil was the only PSC that did not send a minister to the conference - Brazil's representative was Luiz Carneiro de Mendonça, Under-Secretary General for Economic and Technological Affairs of the Ministry of

1 See "Chinese vice president calls for stronger FOCAC" (*Global Times*, 19 November 2010). In a Seminar on the 10th anniversary of FOCAC, Xi Jinping called for joint efforts to make FOCAC stronger and to strengthen the development of a new type of Sino-African partnership.

2 For a perspective on Portugal-China relations, see Paulo Gorjão, "Portugal and China: Prospects for an asymmetrical partnership" (*IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin*, No. 6, April 2010): 3-4.



External Relations. The Brazilian delegation downplayed the importance of not having a higher-ranking official, quoting the ongoing transition from President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva to Dilma Rousseff as the reason for such an absence. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that Brazil seems to undervalue the importance of the Macau Forum. Throughout the last seven years, diplomats and businessmen involved in this process have suggested in private that Brazil's commitment to the Macau Forum is half-hearted.

China's charm offensive

To understand the Macau Forum and China-PSC relations, one must always bear in mind that we are before a Chinese initiative that has been producing a win-win situation for all actors involved, but suits first and foremost China's needs and strategy in world politics.

Throughout the last 15 years China has been pursuing a multi-level and sophisticated diplomacy, strengthening bilateral and multilateral linkages worldwide. Beijing departed from Deng Xiaoping's low profile approach to international relations and embraced a proactive and multilayered role.

In the several multilateral mechanisms, Beijing pursues a flexible approach. Yong Deng underlines three main goals pursued by China in its multilateral ventures, especially in what concerns the developing world: first, to promote social and economic development at home; second, as a way to undermine the China-as-a-threat theories and allow the "recognition of China as a responsible great power", relying "heavily on international institutions to reassure the outside world of its unthreatening intentions"; and third to restrain "potential hostile powers and gaining initiative in shaping the international environment". In sum, "Multilateral diplomacy makes China's power less feared but more welcomed".³

Joshua Kurlantzick describes China's stance in world affairs and Chinese diplomatic and informal initiatives as a "Charm Offensive".⁴ Based on Joseph Nye's soft power, Kurlantzick broadens this concept, including formal diplomacy and investment as instruments of China's soft

power in this "Charm Offensive". Following Nye, "soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want".⁵ China's soft power has been unleashed in multiple ways, anchored in "win-win game" rhetoric and in the promotion of the Chinese language and culture worldwide.

China's charm offensive in the 2000s coincided with the US's decline. The Chinese strategy was intensified when Chinese officials coined the concept of Peaceful Rise (*heping jueqi*) later reframed and altered to Peaceful Development (*heping fazhan*) because of the potentially pejorative impact of the word "rise".

China's economic diplomatic offensive is also related to Beijing's need to counter the perception of China as a threat.⁶

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A sophisticated instrument

The Macau Forum is a paradigmatic example of how China's foreign policy in the 21st century can be creative and sophisticated. Beijing circumvents PSC's own intergovernmental organization - Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). There are two main reasons why China did so. First, São Tomé

and Príncipe has diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Second, China would always prefer to create a new mechanism that would result from a Chinese initiative.

Moreover, the Macau Forum carries a unique nature also because it was established in the Special Administrative Region of Macau, which is itself - alongside Hong Kong - a new polity. It is true that China would not need to establish the Macau Forum to deepen bilateral economic and trade relations with PSC, especially with Angola (China's number one oil supplier) and Brazil (Beijing's major trade partner in Latin America), the major Lusophone powerhouses. The mammoth infrastructure projects and partnerships are carried out beyond and despite the Macau Forum. Given this fact, there are a number of reasons why Beijing set up the Forum and has recently symbolically upgraded its status.

First, summitry is a good way to prevent potential adversaries from coalescing against China. Multilateral

3 See Yong Deng, *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 233-237.

4 Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft power is Transforming the World*. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007).

5 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): 5-6.

6 Willy Lam, "Beijing Wages Economic Diplomacy to Counter 'China Threat' Theory", [*China Brief*, Vol. 10, No. 23, 19 November 2010]: 2-5.

meetings enable China to emerge as a responsible and generous partner that symbolically brings all the countries on the stage at the same level. As part of China's charm offensive, the Forum improves the image of China and raises China's profile.

Second, the Macau Forum can work to persuade São Tomé and Príncipe to abandon its ties with Taiwan and set up linkages with the PRC. By showing how much each Lusophone country is benefiting from its relations with China, Beijing may seduce the 'renegade' PSC.

Third, the instruments created under the auspices of the Forum allow not only state owned and large-scale companies, but also medium-sized enterprises from China, Macau and PSC to reap the benefits of the whole process in the territory formerly administrated by Portugal. Lusophone companies find a friendly environment. Following the Joint Declaration between Portugal and China that led to the handover of Macau in 1999, Portuguese is the region's second official language and Macau's juridical framework is Portuguese-based. Macau is portrayed as the ideal base for Lusophone businessmen, a gateway to China. These companies can use Macau as a platform to set up an office and source local expertise, so as to open the door to the mainland Chinese market.

Fourth, as Macau was opening its gambling market to foreign investors (namely American casino corporations) and becoming the world's top casino hub in terms of revenues, China wanted to give Macau a special role within the People's Republic of China, changing the SAR profile from a mere gaming city to a platform for cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries.

Macau as a platform: work in progress

For several years, the Macau Forum fell short of the expectations of many, especially Portuguese-speaking businessmen and officials. It is not easy to measure quantitatively the role Macau has been playing since 2003 in China-PSC economic relations. Still, there are a number of examples of partnerships via the Macau

connection. Macau-based Geocapital holdings, a joint venture of Portuguese investor Jorge Ferro Ribeiro and Macau gaming tycoon Stanley Ho, leads the way with investments in nearly all Portuguese-speaking countries, focusing on natural resources and investment banking.

The financial sector plays an important role not only as a facilitator for investment but also as a driving force for bilateral trade. In 2006, Bank of China (Macau branch), *Banco Fomento de Angola* (BFA) and *Banco Português de Investimento* (BPI) opened a US\$100 million credit line to support trade between China and Angola.

There are also examples of investments in the construction sector. Macau-based Top Builders Group, one of the largest privately owned construction companies in Macau, has recently set up a branch in Angola.

Tourism may also offer opportunities in African Portuguese-speaking countries. Other Macau entrepreneurs are on the waiting list to open businesses in Lusophone countries: for example, John Lo has plans to build a hotel in Guinea Bissau, following previous agricultural investments since 2001.

Gradually, using Macau as a platform is being perceived as a good choice by governments and private companies that have been taking part in trade and investment fairs in Macau, and participating in a Macau-led delegation to Mainland China. Whenever Macau's Chief Executive visits a province in China, he stresses that the SAR has privileged

relations with PSC, urging Chinese entrepreneurs to take advantage of that.

Despite their shortcomings, Macau has been promoting several people-to-people events that may have a positive impact on the future. The organization of the first edition of the Lusophonia Games (*Jogos da Lusofonia*) was a good example of a far-reaching initiative, bringing the civil society to this dynamic. Macau was not only the host, but also the main propeller of the Lusophonia Games. It has been the headquarters of the permanent secretariat of the Association of Portuguese Speaking Olympic Committees. The local government has also sponsored academic exchanges and PSC cultural festivals.

China and Macau have also been holding over 200 training courses for PSC, which successfully trained over

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2100 officials and technical personnel for the countries, over the past seven years.

However, there is a gap between what is officially portrayed and reality. Macau has been playing a complementary role in China's external relations and has the potential to become an effective and dynamic platform, but among the local business community and some diplomatic circles, there was a feeling of dismay over the efforts of the Macau authorities.

A new impetus

The proposals rolled out by Wen Jiabao in the 3rd Ministerial Conference are expected to elevate the status of the Forum, by replacing rhetoric with action.

The Chinese Premier set the tone in his speech when he emphasized that both sides should expand bilateral trade to reach US\$100 billion in 2013, push two-way investment forward, explore new fields of cooperation and fully take advantage of Macau as a platform. China rolled out six main measures that were included in the Economic and Trade Cooperation Action Plan for 2010-2013, signed by Trade ministers from China and PSC. These include US\$1 billion for cooperation and development to be set up by financial institutions from the Mainland and Macau; a 1.6 billion Yuan in a concessional loan scheme; providing materials, equipment and technical personnel; training 1500 officials and technical personnel in a training center to be established in Macau, offering 1000 one-year government scholarships in China; and providing medical equipment worth 10 million Yuan. Aside from the first measure, all proposals address the "Asian and African members of the Forum".⁷ This means that China clearly looks at Brazil and Portugal separately. In his speech, Wen Jiabao underlined that "the 'eight brothers' of the Forum are at different stages of development, and it is the common responsibility of all the Forum members to help the less-developed Portuguese-speaking countries expedite development and lift themselves from poverty".⁸

7 "China rolls out six measures to help developing Portuguese-speaking countries" (Macau Government Information Bureau, 13 November 2010).

8 "China proposes measures to assist less-developed Portuguese-speaking countries" (Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, 13 November 2010).

The Action Plan also puts emphasis on the need to deepen cooperation in three main areas: media, culture and the financial sector. Cooperation in the financial sector is seen as very important to boost economic ties, while media and cultural activities are regarded as an important means of promoting the exchange of knowledge and raise PSC's image in China and vice versa. Additionally, cooperation is set to be strengthened in areas included in previous Action Plans: intergovernmental cooperation, investment and entrepreneurial cooperation, fisheries and agriculture, engineering and infrastructure building, natural resources, human resources, tourism, transports, direct air and sea routes, pharmaceuticals

and cooperation against infectious diseases, science and technology and people-to-people links.

PSC officials spoke highly of the outcome of the 3rd Ministerial Conference: Angolan Economy Minister Abraão Gourgel stated that the results of the conference exceeded expectations; for Humberto Brito, Assistant Secretary to Cape Verde's Prime Minister, Macau's role as a platform is being deepened and several projects are in the pipeline for the near future, so more can be done compared with the last three years; and Portuguese Secretary of State for Trade Fernando Serrasqueiro said Lisbon has high expectations for the Macau Forum.⁹

But to guarantee that this forum lives up to its expectations, several challenges must be overcome.

Concluding remarks

As China runs the show and Macau is the stage for an ever-closer Sino-Lusophone relation, the lion's share of what can be achieved depends on the effectiveness of the instruments created by the Chinese side. However, the success of the Forum also depends on what the

PSC can give in return.

The Macau Forum reflects China's creativity and far-reaching strategy in international affairs. Though it is sponsored by China's Ministry of Commerce, it is mostly a political instrument to boost China's image. The 3rd Ministerial Conference was welcomed by PSC as a new impulse for Sino-Lusophone cooperation, as

9 Olga Pereira, "Éxito do Fórum é consensual" (*Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 15 November 2010).

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it carries innovative instruments that can take relations to new heights, namely the US\$1 billion fund and the concessional loan scheme.

African Lusophone countries are eager to receive more investment, not only from state owned companies involved in infrastructure and natural resource ventures, but also from private companies.

Portugal needs to foster a closer partnership with China, especially in a time of economic crisis and when the country is struggling with a very serious public debt crisis. Lisbon is eyeing Chinese investment in Portugal's treasury bonds, fixed capital formation, joint partnerships with Chinese companies to invest in Lusophone Africa and to increase exports to China significantly.

One of the main challenges since the very beginning of the Forum was for it to become more than just the sum of its parts, and to bring real added value to pre-existing bilateral relations. The Macau Forum has been able to

fulfill part of what was expected. It is not just a sideshow, but it is yet to become a full-fledged platform.

Through the Forum, China has set up a kind of lightweight and flexible *para-regime*, able to effectively spread China's soft power.

This *para-regime* is not so much about what it is and what has been done under the auspices of the Macau Forum, but more about what it represents. Despite the low level of institutionalization, by using a multilateral institutional mechanism and by bumping up the ideas of a mutually profitable Sino-Lusophone partnership with Macau as a platform, China is instilling a looming narrative. Here, ideas and interests walk hand in hand.

All in all, mutual benefits in a win-win situation bring a bolder power projection. China emerges in this process as a reliable and responsible partner and paves the way for keener political support from these countries in the international system.



Timeline of Events

Angola

1 November (Luanda):

Brazilian Petrobras announced a new offshore oil discovery in a block operated by ENI. According to Oil Minister José Botelho de Vasconcelos, Angola's oil output will reach 2.2 million barrels per day in 2012.

1 November (London):

Angolan Business Agency (ANIP) informed that the country excels at attracting foreign investment, having received US\$2 billion worth in direct investment from January to September.

1-4 November (Luanda):

Headed by Luxembourg's Minister for Economy and Foreign Commerce, a business mission visited Luanda in search of investment opportunities. An agreement in the telecommunications area was signed between both countries.

4 November (Luanda):

Angolan Finance Minister Carlos Lopes stated that Guinea-Bissau requested US\$127.6 million in assistance to guarantee social stability.

6-7 November (Paris/New York):

UNICEF has released a new report pointing out the growing problem of violent immigrant deportations from Angola to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, called upon the authorities of Angola and DRC to investigate the violence and rape allegations.

10 November (Brasília):

Angola's Vice-Minister for Defense Gaspar Rufino attended the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Meeting.

8-14 November (Luanda):

A Portuguese Parliamentary delegation visited Luanda to reinforce ties with Angola's National Assembly and attend the 35th Independence Anniversary ceremonies.

10 November (Cabinda):

On the eve of Angola's 35th Independence Anniversary, a FLEC faction launched an attack killing two to seven military personnel. It is unclear if the attack targeted a small military convoy or a group of Chinese workers escorted by the military. Luanda, through its Secretary of State for Human Rights, Bento Bembe, classified the incident as a "terrorist attack". Nhemba Pirilampo, who is loyal to Nzita Tiago, the former FLEC leader, claimed this attack.

11 November (Luanda):

Angola celebrated its 35th Independence Anniversary.

11 November (Shanghai):

Minister for Trade Maria Idalina Valente stated that China is a strategic partner for Angola's economic diversification as well as an important export market.

13-14 November (Macau):

The Minister of Economy, Abraão Gourgel, attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

15 November (Luanda):

Zambian President Rupiah Banda made a quick stopover en route to Brazil for a three-day visit. Banda was received by Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' and Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos, with whom he discussed the situation of Angolan immigrants in Zambia.

15 November (Luanda):

South African Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos. Political and security issues at regional level were among the topics discussed. Nkoana-Mashabane stated that José Eduardo dos Santos would pay his first official visit to South Africa later this year in order to strengthen bilateral ties.

16 November (Washington):

Together with other 16 African countries, the bank accounts of the Angolan embassy in Washington were frozen or closed by the US government due to lack of transparency. Angolan ambassador Josefina Pitra Diakité called upon the US Secretary of State for assistance to solve this issue.

16 November (Luanda):

Namibian Foreign Affairs Minister Utoni Nujoma was received by his counterpart Assunção dos Anjos. The two discussed the security situation of Southern and Central Africa, in particular those of Guinea Conakry, Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania, as well as bilateral relations between the two nations.

18 November (Luanda):

Angolan ambassador to the US Josefina Pitra Diakité was called back to Luanda to explain to the Foreign Affairs Ministry the embassy's frozen accounts issue. Luanda's gesture was understood as adding tension to bilateral relations with Washington, although official statements were made to dispel those views. However, the US *Chargé d'Affaires* in Luanda, David Brooks, was not invited to the 35th Independence Anniversary event.

19 November (Brazzaville):

Angola – together with the Republic of Congo, DRC, Gabon, Chad, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Central African Republic and Cameroon – signed a UN-sponsored convention to limit the spread of small and light-caliber weapons in Central Africa.

**19-20 November (Luanda):**

Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping visited Angola after a stop in South Africa and before a visit to Botswana. Jinping was received by his counterpart Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' and by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Talks assessed the current bilateral relationship and aimed to improve it with the signing of various protocols, including a deal between Sonangol and Norinco, a Chinese defense conglomerate with interests in the energy sector. Angola and China described their relation as a "Strategic Partnership".

21 November (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos appointed George Chicoty as the new Foreign Affairs Minister.

23-25 November (Abuja):

Defense Minister Cândido Van-Dúnen participated in the 28th Ministerial Meeting of ECOWAS' Mediation and Security Council.

29 November (Luanda):

Angola was chosen to host the first center of the Brazilian Agency for Promotion of Exports and Investments (ApexBrasil) in Africa. Brazil's Foreign Trade Secretary, Welber Oliveira Barral, who praised Angola as his country's strategic partner in Africa, inaugurated the center.

29-30 November (Tripoli):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' represented Angola in the III EU-Africa Heads of State and Government Summit.

Brazil

9 November (London):

Only a day after US President Barack Obama endorsed India's ambitions in the UN Security Council, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague announced that Britain backed a similar bid by Brazil.

9-10 November (Maputo):

President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva - accompanied by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim - inaugurated several Brazilian projects in areas such as education and the local production of AIDS drugs. Lula also took the opportunity to meet with his counterpart Armando Guebuza, as well as with Prime Minister Aires Ali.

10 November (Brasília):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim hosted the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Meeting. Later on, Jobim also signed bilateral cooperation agreements with his counterparts from São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor Leste.

11 November (Kinshasa):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited the Democratic Republic of Congo, where he met with his counterpart Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, seeking to review and enhance bilateral cooperation. Amorim also later met with local United Nations representatives.

11-12 November (Seoul):

President Lula da Silva - accompanied by President-elect Dilma Rousseff - attended the G20 Summit, with the global currency war weighting on the meeting's agenda.

13-14 November (Macau):

Luiz Carneiro de Mendonça, Under-Secretary General for Economic and Technological Affairs, attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

16 November (Brasília):

Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister Simbarashe Mumbengegwi met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim in order to analyze the current bilateral relationship and sign several agreements on political consultations.

18 November (Brasília):

Zambian President Rupiah B. Banda travelled to Brazil where he met with his counterpart Lula da Silva. Trade, social development projects, fighting hunger, biofuels and education were high on the agenda of both officials.

20 November (New Delhi):

The international jury of the Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust - presided by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh - announced the decision to award the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development of 2010 to Lula da Silva.

22 November (Genève):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the "Global South-South Development Expo 2010" and the seminar "The Path Ahead for Trade: FTAs and the Multilateral Trading System in 2020". Amorim also took the opportunity to meet with International Labour Organization Director-General Juan Somavía.

22 November (Santa Cruz):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim attended the IX Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas.

24 November (Brasília):

Sudan's Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Kharti met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim, with bilateral relations and the upcoming national referendum in January 2011 high on the agenda.

25-26 November (Georgetown):

President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended UNASUR's IV Heads of State and Government Summit. The various South American leaders agreed on a 'democratic clause' for the organization and on a concerted position regarding the Falklands, but opted to postpone the decision on who will be UNASUR's next Secretary-General.

29 November (Belgrade):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and his Serbian counterpart Dragan Sutanovac signed a bilateral cooperation agreement regarding matters of defense. Jobim also met with Serbia President Boris Tadic.

Cape Verde

10 November (Brasília):

Defense Minister Cristina Lima attended the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Meeting.

**13-17 November (Maputo):**

President Pedro Pires met with his counterpart Armando Guebuza and addressed the Mozambican Parliament.

13-14 November (Macau):

The Minister of Infrastructure, Transport and Sea, Manuel Inocência Sousa, attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

16 November (Praia):

São Tomé and Príncipe's Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada met with his counterpart José Maria Neves. The review of bilateral cooperation and the situation of the Cape Verdean community in São Tomé and Príncipe were high on the agenda.

17 November (Praia):

According to the head of the European Union's delegation to Cape Verde, Josep Coll, the European Commission has approved the donation of €9 million to Cape Verde under the terms of the "Flex Vulnerability" mechanism. The funds are to provide support for the government's fiscal execution and macroeconomic policies as well as to reduce the impact of the crisis and balance the country's accounts.

22 November (Praia):

President Pedro Pires scheduled the country's next legislative elections for February 6th, 2011.

29-30 November (Tripoli):

Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires and Foreign Minister José Brito attended the III EU-Africa Heads of State and Government Summit.

Guinea-Bissau

2 November (Addis Abeba):

The African Union's Peace and Security Council analyzed the report prepared by its Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau, Sebastião Isata. The Council praised Angola's efforts to contribute to the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau, although it expressed its deep concerns over internal divisions within the ruling political class.

4 November (Luanda):

Angolan Finance Minister Carlos Lopes stated that Guinea-Bissau requested US\$127.6 million in assistance to guarantee social stability.

5 November (New York):

The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba presented the latest report on Guinea-Bissau to the Security Council. Mutaboba insisted that the international community and donors must remain involved in Guinea-Bissau, defending that positive steps were recently taken in the country. He highlighted the authorities' commitment to the Security Sector Reform process, seen as a key element in stabilizing Guinea-Bissau, as well as the timely payment of salaries, a process of national reconciliation and the official support request to the UN to combat drug trafficking. The report pointed out that civilian and military leaders must not only show commitment but also improve their actions and enforce effective rule of law.

9 November (Bissau):

The new prisons of Mansoa and Bafatá, crucial in the overall Security Sector Reform process, were inaugurated last September, but the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) informed that they would only become operational in early 2011.

10 November (Brasília):

Guinea-Bissau's Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva attended the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Meeting. The CPLP's Defense Ministers urged Guinea-Bissau to develop a Security Sector Reform plan in accordance to the rule of law in the final statement of their meeting. Portuguese Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva considered the situation in Guinea-Bissau "difficult and worrying".

10 November (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá inaugurated the new government headquarters which will accommodate 12 ministries. In the ceremony Sanhá praised Chinese cooperation.

13-14 November (Macau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

16 November (Bissau):

On the occasion of Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces 46th anniversary, the country's Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva invited the Armed Forces to reflect on the Security Sector Reform process and determine how its objectives can be reached.

20 November (Lisbon):

At the margins of the NATO/Afghanistan Summit in Lisbon, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the international community needs to deepen its efforts to stabilize Guinea-Bissau and amass the financial resources needed to support the Security Sector Reform process.

23 November (New York):

The UN Security Council unanimously decided to extend the mandate for its UN Integrated Peace Building Office in Guinea-Bissau for a further year, until December 31st 2011. The council reiterated its concerns regarding the lack of progress in the Security Sector Reform process as well as severe shortfalls in civilian oversight of the armed forces.

25 November (Bissau):

The president of the Portuguese Institute for Development Support (IPAD), Manuel Correia, declared that Portuguese development efforts towards Guinea-Bissau will be focused on education and security cooperation during the next three years.

29 November (Abuja):

ECOWAS will grant US\$6 million to revive Guinea-Bissau's electricity grid.

29-30 November (Tripoli):

Guinea-Bissau's Foreign Minister Adelino Mano Queta attended the III EU-Africa Heads of State and Government Summit.

Mozambique

1 November (Maputo):

The International Monetary Fund's new representative for Mozambique Victor Lledo expects that the country's economic growth will top 7% in 2010 and accelerate in the middle term to 8%.

**7-8 November (Doha):**

President Armando Guebuza - together with Foreign Minister Oldemiro Báloi - visited Qatar at the invitation of Emir Sheik Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, seeking to reinforce bilateral economic and diplomatic relations.

9-10 November (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza welcomed his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva in his farewell visit to Africa.

10 November (Brasília):

Defense Minister Felipe Nyusi attended the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Meeting.

13-14 November (Macau):

Prime Minister Aires Ali attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

13-17 November (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza hosted his Cape Verdean counterpart Pedro Pires in his five-day visit, aimed at improving bilateral relations.

29-30 November (Tripoli):

President Armando Guebuza attended the III EU-Africa Heads of State and Government Summit.

Portugal

5 November (Brussels):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva met with NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to review preparations for the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon. The new future distribution of the organization's military commands - with direct implications for Portugal - was equally addressed.

6-7 November (Lisbon):

Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Portugal, where he took the opportunity to meet with the highest authorities, including President Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates and Head of Parliament Jaime Gama, seeking to deepen bilateral relations between both countries. Simultaneously, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Trade Minister Cheng Deming met with their Portuguese counterparts, Luís Amado and José Vieira da Silva.

9 November (Oeiras):

Prime Minister José Sócrates welcomed his Algerian counterpart Ahmed Ouyahia for the III Portugal-Algeria Summit. Strengthening and promoting bilateral economic relations was high on the agenda. Prime Minister Sócrates took the opportunity to state that Northern Africa is currently a clear priority for Portuguese foreign policy.

10 November (Brasília):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the 12th CPLP Meeting of Defense Ministers, where enhanced defense cooperation between all parts was high on the agenda. Santos Silva also took the opportunity to reassure his peers of NATO's friendly intentions towards the South Atlantic, given the current revision of the organization's Strategic Concept.

13-14 November (Macau):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries. Sócrates took this opportunity to meet with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao, seeking to further boost trade and economic relations while also signing a tourism cooperation agreement.

17 November (Lisbon):

Newly-appointed Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Trinidad Jiménez made her first official visit abroad to Portugal, where she met with her counterpart Luís Amado, President Anibal Cavaco Silva and Prime Minister José Sócrates. Preparations for the 2011 Portugal-Spain Summit, December's European Council, the NATO Summit and the next Ibero-American Summit, were high on the agenda.

19-20 November (Lisbon):

Prime Minister José Sócrates hosted NATO's Heads of State and Government Summit which brought to Lisbon the leaders of its 28 members, seeking to reenergize the 61-year-old organization. Among other issues, the attending delegations approved a new Strategic Concept, set a deadline calendar for operations in Afghanistan, agreed on a continental missile-defense shield and revamped NATO-Russia ties. Furthermore, Portugal also announced that it would increase its contribution to the ISAF mission with another 41 instructors. On

the sidelines, US President Barack Obama met with President Anibal Cavaco Silva and Prime Minister José Sócrates, promising to enhance bilateral cooperation between the two states. Sócrates later held private meetings with British and Australian counterparts, David Cameron and Julia Gillard, among other officials, while President Cavaco Silva met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Likewise, Foreign Minister Luís Amado took the opportunity to meet with several of his counterparts - including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon.

19-20 November (Díli):

Secretary of State for Defense Marcos Perestrello signed a new technical-military cooperation agreement between Timor Leste and Portugal.

22 November (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU's Foreign Affairs Council where the Middle East, Sudan, Myanmar and the upcoming EU Summits with Africa, Russia and India were high on the agenda. Simultaneously, Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the General Affairs Council with the aim of preparing the next European Council in December.

25 November (Lisbon):

Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Saïda Chtioui met with her Portuguese counterpart João Gomes Cravinho, with Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie and Foreign Minister Luís Amado. Bilateral relations and economic ties were high on the agenda.

29-30 November (Tripoli):

Prime Minister José Sócrates and Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the III EU-Africa Heads of State and Government Summit. Common growth and development as well as job creation and illegal immigration were high on the agenda. Sócrates also took the opportunity to meet with his counterparts from Mozambique, Morocco and Libya.



São Tomé and Príncipe

10 November (Brasília):

São Tomé and Príncipe's Minister of Public Security and Defense Carlos Stock attended the 12th CPLP Defense Ministers Meeting. Stock also took the opportunity to sign an enhanced cooperation agreement with his Brazilian counterpart Nelson Jobim.

16 November (Praia):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada met with his Cape Verdean counterpart José Maria Neves, seeking to enhance bilateral ties between the two countries.

19 November (Brazzaville):

Together with the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Chad, Angola, Central African Republic and Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe signed a UN-sponsored convention to limit the spread of small and light-caliber weapons in Central Africa.

23 November (São Tomé):

According to the National Oil Agency (ANP), six foreign companies are currently competing for the seven blocks in auction: Afex Global, Force Petroleum, Group Gema, SA, O.E. Engineering, SA, Oranto Petroleum and Ovret Neregy.

24 November (São Tomé):

According to the first secretary of the Japanese embassy to São Tomé and Príncipe, Wahito Yamada, his country has donated 3320 tons of rice, as part of the Japanese food aid program.

29-30 November (Tripoli):

President Fradique de Menezes and Foreign Minister Salavador dos Ramos attended the III EU-Africa Heads of State and Government Summit.

Timor Leste

4 November (Sydney):

The head of Timor Leste's Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, Duarte Nunes, disclosed to Australian newspaper Sydney Morning Herald that Australian troops will begin withdrawing from Timor Leste in 2012 – although there has been no official confirmation so far.

10 November (New York):

After the last-minute announcement of its candidacy to the soon-to-be created UN Women agency, Timor Leste managed to beat Iran in securing one of the coveted seats due to strong international opposition to the latter's intentions. That much was clear when in the UN Economic and Social Council, Iran obtained the lowest number of votes of the 11 Asian nations vying for the 10 seats on the UN Women's board, only receiving 19 votes compared to 36 for Timor Leste.

10 November (Brasília):

Timor Leste's Secretary of State for Defense Júlio Tomás Pinto attended the 12th CPLP Defense Minister Meeting. Later, Tomás Pinto also signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with his Brazilian counterpart Nelson Jobim.

13-14 November (Macau):

President José Ramos-Horta attended the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries. Ramos-Horta also met with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao, as well as with local businessmen.

14 November (Macau):

According to Geocapital's Chief Executive Jorge Ferro Ribeiro, the financial company plans to open an investment bank in Timor Leste at the beginning of 2011.

15 November (Díli):

President José Ramos-Horta urged the US and Europe to lift sanctions against Myanmar after the junta released opposition leader and fellow Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.

19-20 November (Díli):

Portuguese Secretary of State for Defense Marcos Perestrello travelled to Timor Leste with a new technical-military cooperation agreement between the two countries high on the agenda.

22 November (Díli):

The District Court in Díli cleared Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa of all charges regarding previous accusations of an alleged abuse of power over diplomatic appointments by now Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres, when he was Timor Leste's ambassador to the UN. Guterres, however, is still awaiting appeal to know if he will be indeed prosecuted.



Reading List

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- Pedro Seabra, "A golden opportunity for Dilma Rousseff" (*IPRIS Viewpoints*, No. 24, November 2010).
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