<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><!--StartFragment--><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">Dear colleagues<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">I am curious to know, if others have read the
Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion of February 2011, your views on its
content.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The Opinion makes a distinctive and valuable
contribution in the fields of due diligence, environmental impact assessment
and the precautionary principle and in many important ways to the
interpretation of the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The issue I mainly want to comment on here,
though, is the way in which the opinion deals with state responsibility.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>On the one hand a potentially valuable
contribution is made in dealing with how private parties’ obligations come into
effect on the international plane.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>At
the same time, however, the overall approach for dealing with responsibility
could possibly have been clearer.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">My concern relates to the Opinion’s failure always
to distinguish between responsibility (in the sense of state responsibility),
liability (in the sense used in English, which we might say refers to exposure
to obligations to provide particular forms of reparation – thus there can be
degrees of liability) and obligation (defined in the Opinion to include legal
obligations expressed as ‘responsibilities’ in UNCLOS).<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The Opinion deals quite clearly with
liability and obligation (see paras 64 – 71) but the omission to set these
against the notion of state responsibility from the beginning leads to a lack
of clarity later in the opinion.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>It of
course is possible this came about through an attempt to avoid confusion, as
the French and Spanish terms for liability are the same as those for
responsibility.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">I would be pleased to hear others’ views on the
points below.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">In paras 103 – 106 and para 108 of the Opinion it
seems to me that here we are seeing an evolution in the development of
understandings about the responsibility of private parties under international
law.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>In these paragraphs , the Chamber
finds a way to deal with the issue of which substantive rules bind states and
which bind operators by (a) finding that operators are obliged to comply with a
broad set of rules including various provisions of UNCLOS and then (b)
observing that States’ ‘responsibility to ensure’ in their domestic law that
contractors comply with these rules is the mechanism by which these treaty
rules become effective for contractors.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>So
far as (b) is concerned, the idea of the ‘mechanism’ of States’ ‘responsibilities
to ensure’ appears a sound description of how the Convention operates. So far
as (a) is concerned, the Convention does refer to
“contractors’ obligations under this Convention”.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The interesting question is whether the
language of obligation here must be regarded as a little softer than usual and
perhaps more descriptive than prescriptive, until such time as the law on state
responsibility evolves to a point where private parties are recognised as being
bound by rules between states in fields of international law additional to
international criminal law.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Or is the
tribunal saying that we have already reached this stage?<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>How sustainable is such a view?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">From para 164 the Chamber addresses Question 2,
the extent of a State party’s liability for a sponsored entity’s failure to
comply with the Convention.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The Chamber
observes that under Article 139(2) of UNCLOS the failure of a sponsoring State
to carry out its responsibilities entails liability only if there is damage.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Where there is no damage UNCLOS is
silent.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>However in such circumstances a State
is nevertheless in breach of its obligations, and the Chamber could have made
more of the point that the State’s international <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:
normal">responsibility</i> is engaged, with a range of consequences including
the obligation to bring the situation of breach to an end.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The Chamber did make this point in para 178, but
referred to customary international law on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">‘liability’.
</i><span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>A state will also incur
responsibility where the link between the State’s breach of its obligations and
any damage cannot be established.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Here
the Chamber more helpfully did refer to the customary international law on
State <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">responsibility,</i> in para 183.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">The Chamber also relied on the law of state
responsibility to reach the finding that the amount of compensation payable by
sponsoring States would be the same as the contractors’ liability under para
193 of UNCLOS for the actual amount of damage.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">
</span>It was perhaps unfortunate that the Chamber introduced an element of
confusion on the point, by stating in para 195 that the provisions in UNCLOS or
contractors’ liability were equally ‘valid’ for States.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Readers must take their understanding of the
point from the surrounding paragraphs of the opinion, which more clearly
indicate that the extent of reparation is to be determined based on the law of
state responsibility.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">The Chamber rightly leaves open the form of
reparation to be provided by States, which will depend on the circumstances.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">There may be a slight sense of disappointment
that the Chamber did not do more to indicate how international law needs to be
developed further in the direction reflected in the ILC Principles on the Allocation of Loss in Case
of Transboundary Harm arising out of Hazardous Activities (referred to in para
209).<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Given that the Chamber may have
moved forward everyone’s thinking in the realm of private parties’ potential <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">responsibility</i> under international law
by identifying private parties’ obligations under UNCLOS, as discussed above, some
might consider it a pity that there was no real hint of parallel reasoning in
relation to the Principles.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>In the case
of the Principles it would obviously not be possible to rely on the language of
obligation found in UNCLOS.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>However the
Principles are an important supplement to the law on state responsibility, and
there is a serious need to encourage the international community to consider their
content further.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Arguably it should be
possible to rely on States’ control over private parties in order to hold States directly accountable for helping address harm caused by hazardous activities. There is a pressing need globally for a sense of public duty in relation to harmful
transboundary activity.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Additionally, it
will be recalled that the ILC decided not to extend the principles to cover the
global commons. However arguably the approach
on which the Principles are based should apply beyond national territory: <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>the losses caused by environmental harm should
be addressed through remedial action and other forms of response.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">In conclusion, in relation to the international
legal regime on state responsibility generally, it is important that the
Chamber identified that this field of international law is not static (see para
211).<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>It is likely we will see further
developments here in future, and in addition ongoing consideration should be
given to how to deal with significant environmental harm in situations due to
hazardous activities that are not illegal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">In paragraph 180 the Chamber touched helpfully
on the potential, consistently with Article 48 of the ILC Articles on State
Responsibility, for any State party to require performance of the obligation of
reparation in relation to damage to the environment of the high seas and the
area.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The Chamber’s reference to
compensation rather than the broader concept of reparation, which may include
restoration, is puzzling.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Perhaps the
Chamber was referring to financial payments directed to restoration or other
forms of reparation.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"">On another point, is the concordance between
different language versions of UNCLOS is really as strong as described in paras
61 – 63 of the opinion?<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> T</span>he Chamber finds that States’ obligation to “ensure” contractors’ conduct
fulfils the rules is one of conduct rather than result.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>This does not seem consistent with the plain
English meaning of “ensure”. Even the Concise Oxford gives the meaning of
ensuring as “making certain”.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>One
wonders whether the Chamber should have made more of the French, Spanish and
other language texts in para 110 rather than leaving them to a later para. One
can see that ideally it would be the case that the different language versions
of UNCLOS were completely concordant.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">
</span>However, it there are genuinely differences between them, these minor
differences need to be dealt with authoritatively, lucidly and promptly as they
arise.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:
justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-NZ" style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman""><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<!--EndFragment-->
<div>
<div style="font-size: 12px; "><div>-- </div><div><br></div><div>Dr. Caroline E. Foster</div><div>BA LLB (Cantuar) LLM PHD (Cantab) </div><div>Senior Lecturer, School of Law</div><div><br></div><div>Room 2.16, Bldg 803</div><div>9 Eden Crescent</div><div>University of Auckland</div><div>Private Bag 92019</div><div>New Zealand</div></div>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Feb 22, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Don Anton wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"></div><br></body></html>