[LINK] FLoods taking out banking infrastructure

[Brendan]

On 01/13/2011 06:34 PM, Richard Chirgwin wrote:
> On 13/01/11 6:15 PM, rene wrote:
>> On Thu, 13 Jan 2011 14:34:59 +1030, Steven Clark wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/01/11 12:50, grove at zeta.org.au wrote:
>>>> It does beg the question as to why the CUA would not have a
>>>> geoclustered datacentre or similar offsite ability to maintain
>>
>> services......

[]

>> I, personally, would be quite cautious about claiming any type of online
>> commercial business should have better prepared, because I'm really
>> doubtful about the feasibility and cost/benefit practicalities of being
>> fully prepared for what is, at this time, a one in some 40 year event.
> Let's see.
> 
> 1. When damn near every service is going to be affected - as Mark Colvin 
> Tweeted yesterday, in all but 28 countries in the world this flood was 
> so large it would cross borders - it's pettifogging to say "this service 
> shouldn't have gone down". It's amazing things survived as well as they did.

Service (ie to end user) maybe, but allow me to pettifog on the site itself. 

The point of DR is to have a site which won't be affect by things that the main site is affected by.  Given that it's not bob and mary's corner store, but a financial institution I would have thought 'flood' would be something that ought to be on their list of considerations and located the DR site accordingly. 

If it is a failure of a secondary nature then so be it - "no electricity" shouldn't cut it as they should have on site generators, but perhaps a problem with connectivity to/from the site sounds more plausible?  A *DR site* which is taken out by the same flood as the primary seems to me a failure in planning. 

Brendan