[LINK] The Australia-US Alliance

[stephen at melbpc.org.au]

Recently Link had some robust and interesting discussion regarding the
purchase of Chinese vrs American NBN ICT resources. The Link consensus
was quite definite regarding American, or perhaps non-Chinese, which I
for one agreed with. However the Link discussions also involve broader
geo-political implications and futures for Australia going forward. As
these are off-topic for Link, one might simply put the following paper
out here, for reflection, with the thinking that *maybe* Australia may 
indeed need to seriously reconsider our place in the world? Who knows?

The Australia-US Alliance: A Cost/Benefit Analysis

By Cavan Hogue 19 April 2012 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Associate%
20Papers/FDI_Associate_Paper_-_19_April_2012.pdf


Key Points

It is time for a hard-headed cost/benefit analysis of the US Alliance. 

Any such analysis should include the following questions: Does the 
Alliance create more problems than it solves? In the Indo-Pacific Region, 
do we want a balance between the US and China, or US dominance? What 
intelligence do we get from the US that would still be needed without the 
Alliance?

Summary

The American alliance is an article of faith in Australia because it is 
said to underpin our security. There have been many reviews and White 
Papers but perhaps it is time for a hard-headed cost/benefit analysis. 
Here I consider some of the questions that must be asked.

Analysis

Australians have always been afraid of standing on their own two feet. We 
need a “sugar daddy” to protect us from a potentially hostile world. 
Britain was that protector until the British lion lost its teeth. We then 
turned to Uncle Sam, who is our current protector, but do we really need 
a protector? Australia and Singapore are the only countries in our 
immediate region whose armed forces are externally oriented. All the 
others in South-East Asia have a domestic capability directed primarily 
towards the suppression of internal unrest, although this also gives them 
a capability to defend themselves against foreign invasion. India is 
developing a bluewater navy that could project power beyond its borders 
and China has a growing capability to operate outside its borders. North 
Korea is developing missiles that could reach South-East Asia. The only 
country capable of invading Australia, however, is the USA and not even 
the looniest lefty would suggest that they have any intention of 
attacking us. There is, therefore, no current external threat to the 
Australian continent and it is hard to see one emerging in the 
foreseeable future. Furthermore, in the 60 years that ANZUS has been in 
existence, there has been no threat of invasion to Australia. We do, 
however, also need to think about our lines of communication and trade 
with the outside world.

The Pros

So, the main argument for the alliance is based on the assumption that 
some currently unforeseen threat might emerge in the future which would 
require US intervention to protect us, either by coming to our aid 
directly or by providing a deterrent to a potential aggressor. While some 
people believe that China poses a future threat to Australia, most do not.
The second line of argument is that the US presence contributes to 
regional security and provides a balance to China and other potential 
hegemonic powers. It is said that most other countries in the region 
welcome this presence. Stability in the region protects our lines of 
communication.

The third benefit we get from the alliance is access to US intelligence, 
particularly technical capabilities, such as satellite imaging.

The Cons

If we want the US cavalry to come thundering over the hill in our hour of 
need, then we must pay the premiums. Supporting US military adventures is 
the price we pay. ANZUS does not require the US to defend Australia if we 
are attacked, only to think about it. Therefore, we have to keep 
reminding them that we are a loyal little ally deserving of their 
support. The alliance has got us into Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, none 
of which, arguably, has done us much good. There will be strong pressure 
from the US for us to join in other military adventures that do not 
necessarily serve Australian interests.

The US has made it clear that it wants to be the pre-eminent power in the 
region, yet China also sees itself as number one. We cannot assume that 
the current moderate US Administration will remain in power and we may 
find ourselves under great pressure to declare for the US against China. 
Even under a moderate administration, American policymakers expect us to 
follow where they lead.

Another downside of the alliance is that we are seen by many other 
countries as a client state of the US. This may increase the risk of 
terrorist attacks on Australia if it is seen as a proxy for the US.
If we are to support the US in its overseas ventures, our military 
planners face a major problem in working out what force structure to 
build. Where will they ask us to join them next?

Some Complexities

Does it really matter if other countries see us as clients of the 
Americans? It can be argued that being seen as such gives us some form of 
protection from potential aggressors, but it may also increase the risk 
of terrorist attacks on us. For example, North Korea might be tempted to 
lob a missile at us because we are seen as a proxy for the US. If we were 
not, why would they bother?

Some would argue that the sacrifices made by our troops in insurance 
premium wars are an argument against the alliance. Perhaps so, but these 
forays do provide valuable combat experience for our armed forces. No 
amount of training can substitute for the experience of battle, even 
though it involves casualties.

Do we receive reliable intelligence that tells us anything we really need 
to know that we could not get from other sources? Does this intelligence 
in any way further Australian interests? To answer this question we would 
need access to classified material that will probably not be released. It 
is worth noting, however, that US intelligence misled us on Iraq and 
presumably the Americans are not above doctoring what they give us in 
order to pursue American interests. While it may be hard to answer this 
question, we can ask, what kind of information do we need from the 
Americans to protect Australian interests? What intelligence do we get 
that we only need because of the alliance?

While the fall may be a long way off, the American Empire has begun its 
decline and the Chinese Empire is reasserting what it sees as its 
rightful place in the region. Many regional countries favour a balance 
between the two powers but we seem to be one of the few that wants an 
imbalance in favour of the US. The government has said that our alliance 
with the US (which we seem to be building up) is not directed against 
China. Of course, the government must say publicly that it is not 
directed against China, but are we fooling anyone? If not China, then who 
is it directed against?

Is it possible, as the new Foreign Minister Bob Carr has suggested, to 
keep the alliance but to adopt a more independent posture within it? 
Obviously, we want to maintain good relations with the US. The question 
here is how independent can we be while maintaining our image in the US 
as a dependable ally? 

It is perhaps instructive to note that the only time the US has sent a 
serious career ambassador (Marshall Green), to Australia was during the 
Whitlam years, when the US was concerned that we were becoming too 
independent. The others have been “friends of the President” who were 
given a comfortable job in return for domestic services rendered.

These are just some of the questions that need to be asked, but surely it 
is time to start asking them. It is one thing to remain a good friend, 
but too close an embrace will lead Americans and others to resurrect 
the “deputy sheriff” tag. The Americans have always put their own 
interests first and will continue to do so; we should follow their good 
example. American interests will not always be the same as Australian and 
vice versa.

The bottom line, however, is the domestic political one. Australians are 
afraid of the outside world and convinced of their inability to cope with 
it. Any Australian government which suggested that we do without a great 
and powerful friend to look after us would have to consider the electoral 
implications.

About the Author: Cavan Hogue was Ambassador and Deputy Permanent 
Representative when Australia was last on the United Nations Security 
Council. He has also served as head of mission in Mexico, Kuala Lumpur, 
Moscow and Bangkok, as well as holding senior positions in other posts 
and in Canberra. He is now an Adjunct Professor in International 
Communication at Macquarie University, Sydney.

*****

Cheers,
Stephen