[LINK] Re: blind faith in electronic voting

[Craig Sanders]

On Tue, Nov 14, 2006 at 07:04:43PM +1100, Howard Lowndes wrote:
> One reason that is often quoted is the ability to have earlier
> results, but that too is a furphey as the two party preferred count
> that is conducted as part of the primary count immediately after the
> polls close, is very rarely far adrift from the final result.

in any case, who cares if the final result takes 2 or 3 days(*) rather
than a few hours? the government isn't going to change for a few months
anyway. there's no great urgency, certainly none that justifies putting
the safety of the election at risk.

the real problem with e-voting is that it enables the bulk, wholesale
automation of electoral fraud. instead of relying on many eyes observing
the process, and the sheer expense of corrupting enough electoral
officers to make a significant difference (and the risk of exposure with
each approach to an individual), the safety of e-voting relies on a very
small number of people who audit the code and operate the machines.

i.e. it changes the scale of fraud so that it is much more viable.

this is a risk that is not worth taking: the risk is far too high, and
the benefits are far too trivial.

craig

(*) and even that is only for those electorates with a very close
match, where 2nd and 3rd and Nth preferences really make a difference.
the results in most electorates are known within a few hours of the
close of voting, even with the so-called inefficient manual counting.


-- 
craig sanders <cas at taz.net.au>           (part time cyborg)