[LINK] Cyberwar: Hypothetical Scenario for Teaching ICT, Ethics

Chris Johnson Chris.Johnson at anu.edu.au
Thu Feb 25 12:46:41 AEDT 2016


> At 0955 25/2/16 Roger Clarke wrote:
>
> At 8:49 +1100 25/2/16, Tom Worthington wrote:
>> Last week I attended a series of seminars as part of the "Securing our
>> Future in Cyberspace" Conference, hosted by the Australian National
>> University. This gave me inspiration for new material to teach ICT
>> Ethics at ANU. Here is a draft. Comments are welcome:
>>
http://blog.highereducationwhisperer.com/2016/02/cyberwar-over-south-china-sea.html
>

This is the wrong frame of reference - ICT ethics is not yet in a state
of warfare.
Discussing ethics for civilians should avoid overtly military scenarios
because - different sets of rules apply
(warn and destroy an aircraft introducing into airspace? - in civilian
life this is criminal damage and manslaughter)

The proposal does not say which code of ethics needs to be considered.
The scenario and the primary reference seem to assume a state of
"warfare" - I hope that we can discuss the ethics and keep the situation
well short of that condition, or distinguish which personal
uniform/badge/oath is involved.
Unarmed electronic sabotage of facilities anywhere is illegal, immoral,
unethical. BUT undeniably military ownership, effect, situation is an
interesting scenario.
Deniability ("this is a civilian nuclear power program"), indirect
military connections (in country X the army runs the hospitals which
serve civilians; in country Y, civilian hospitals also do research into
military-grade exo-skeletons; in country Z, there is a military academy
[a legitimate target?] which also takes non-military students). Since
when is it legal even in war to attack /damage/sabotage ANY kind of
hospital?
But to discus this the students need to have access to Geneva
conventions etc and a huge pile of literature. ICT ethics needs more focus.


Roger Clarke wrote:
> Presumbly you want 'softer' alternatives to emerge, rather than lead them by the nose?
> 
> My lay understanding is that Stuxnet was intended to (and maybe actually did) cause the centrifuges to go out of control, resulting in physical damage (and the risk of physical harm to people).
> 
> In that context, you can see the rationale for physical damage - 'we get one shot at this, and we need to slow down their work'.
> 
> In the scenario you're running, the purpose is 'diplomatic' rather than 'military' per se, i.e. embarrassent will do.  Is there a way to disable / disrupt without damaging, and without risking harm to the other country's military personnel (who, we understand, are still at this stage people).
> 
> 
> Another angle is the ethics of disclosing to a possible future enemy the country's capability to disable, disrupt and even damage military kit.  The recent, poorly-named but good-fun film nominally on Turing's Bletchley years gave another run to the WWII dilemma of not using all the available intel, in order to avoid disclosing that Enigma had been cracked.
> 
> It also causes 'the other side' to close up at least one current access path that might otherwise have remained available for future use.  (At any given time, there are only so many zero-day - stupid term, call them 'vulnerability' - exploits available).
> 




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