[LINK] Schneier's explanation of Apple v. FBI

[Carl Makin]

> On 16 Mar 2016, at 6:18 PM, David Lochrin <dlochrin at d2.net.au> wrote:
> I think the major problem is the precedent which would be set by Apple's compliance, and the FBI seem to be interested in the precedent because they've apparently asked for a generalised back door, not just help in retrieving the data on the device in question.

I agree this is the issue.  It’s pretty clear that if the FBI gets it’s way then that will open the floodgates of more FBI and state police warrants for the same thing.  Even if the capability is restricted, in this case, to just the iPhone 5C of the terrorist in question, once the precedent is set then an update for each different phone is just another warrant away.

> In any case, how could Apple be of much help in accessing the data on that particular device if the owner has chosen a long pass-phrase?  Surely it's too late now.  Maybe a knowledgeable Linker could clarify the issues?

The FBI are asking (on the face of it) for custom firmware that will do away with the 10 password limit, and the time delay between guessing passwords.  They also want an electronic method for entering passwords so they can automate the process.  It’s a brute force attack on the PIN/password.  Even if there is a moderately complex password, being able to try 100s or even 1000s of passwords per second would make recovery simply a matter of time.


Carl.