[LINK] COVIDSafe ‘extremely limited’: New research

[Roger Clarke]

On 9/6/20 11:10 am, Bernard Robertson-Dunn wrote:
> [COVIDSafe is starting to look like yet another simple idea, badly (or
> not at all), thought through.

I wrote to Danham Sadler at 08:00, saying:
> At a quick glance, the authors seem to have completely overlooked the
question of whether the app performs the functions claimed for it.
>
> There's ample evidence that it doesn't work, and hence analyses of the
kind they've published are rather beside the point.
>
> See:
>      The Effectiveness of Bluetooth Proximity Apps
>      in Tracing People with COVID-19 Exposure Risk
>           http://rogerclarke.com/EC/EBPA.html
>
> This was reported in a couple of publications:
>
https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/business-law/we-need-examine-many-narratives-covidsafe-app
>
https://ia.acs.org.au/article/2020/the-covidsafe-app-and-professional-responsibility.html

_______________________

> COVIDSafe ‘extremely limited’: New research
> https://www.innovationaus.com/covidsafe-extremely-limited-new-research/
> Denham Sadler
> Senior Reporter
> 9 June 2020
> 
> The effectiveness of COVIDSafe is “extremely limited” and the contact
> tracing app is unlikely to help prevent the spread of the virus,
> according to a new policy paper.
> 
> The paper, written by academics from the Auckland University of
> Technology, the University of Queensland,  the University of Auckland
> and Massey University makes a strong argument for the adoption of the
> Google and Apple framework for contact tracing, which provides for a
> quicker process that could limit the spread of coronavirus.
> 
> COVIDSafe was launched by the Australian government in April as a way to
> assist with manual contact tracing once some social restrictions had
> lifted. It uses Bluetooth technology to record contact between users,
> with this information stored on the device.
> 
> If a user tests positive for COVID-19, they then consent for this data
> to be sent to the national database store, with it then passed on to
> state and territory contact tracers. It is primarily designed to assist
> manual contact tracing by providing the contact information for people
> that a positive case may not have been able to identify, primarily
> random people they happen to have close contact with.
> 
> But this centralised model is too slow to effectively combat the spread
> of COVID-19, which requires quick isolation of close contacts due to the
> virus’ early infection times, the paper found.
> 
> The researchers said that COVID-19 contact tracing “needs to occur at
> exceptional speeds to control transmission”, and that COVIDSafe does not
> provide for this, meaning authorities are then “very limited in their
> ability to achieve control”.
> 
> “These types of enhanced manual tracing apps – such as the Australian
> COVIDSafe app – are extremely limited in their ability to speed up
> contact tracing,” the paper said.
> 
> “These apps offer more comprehensive contact tracing than manualised
> systems alone, but are not expected to greatly enhance speed. Since
> speed is the most crucial element for controlling spread of COVID-19, it
> is unlikely that these apps can reduce reproduction rates.”
> 
> The researchers argue that the decentralised model for digital contact
> tracing, as adopted by Google and Apple in their collaborative
> framework, would be more effective due to its speed.
> 
> Under this model, the contact tracing app itself generates an automated
> instantaneous notification to users if they have had contact with
> another user who has since tested positive for COVID-19.
> 
> This notification would then ideally be followed up by a health official.
> 
> But the Google and Apple framework is at odds with the way COVIDSafe
> works, and implementing the API would involve a significant adjustment
> of the app.
> 
> The federal government opted for a centralised model where contact
> information is sent to a database and then onto state and territory
> health authorities, rather than the decentralised model where devices
> check against a list of confirmed cases and notify the users directly.
> 
> The Australian government appears unlikely to adopt this model after
> recently updating COVIDSafe to improve functionality on Apple devices,
> something that had plagued the early rollout of the service.
> 
> Australia and New Zealand currently have vastly different contact
> tracing apps in place, something which could impact the ability to open
> a trans-Tasman bubble and allow travel between the two countries
> significantly earlier than the rest of the world.
> 
> While Australia’s app records contact between its users, New Zealand’s
> version records where users have visited, requiring them to scan QR
> codes at locations they go to. The two countries have regularly been
> sharing information on their different approaches and the potential to
> coordinate them, with New Zealand participating in the ministerial council.
> 
> The effectiveness of contact tracing apps relies nearly entirely on
> trust in the government, and any negative revelations or lack of
> transparency will also impact its effectiveness, the report found.
> 
> “The ethical justification of the app rests upon its capacity to deliver
> significant benefits to communities and individuals in ways which
> respect legitimate concerns about, for instance, consent, the security
> and use of information, the preservation of a role for human judgement
> and the possibility that the app will exacerbate existing social
> inequalities,” it said.
> 
> “It is possible that a lack of evidence and low uptake will diminish
> trust, and have negative spill-over effects to other recommendations
> that government might be making in managing the pandemic.
> 
> “This suggests that governments promoting contact tracing apps ought to
> ensure that their statements about efficacy are restricted to those that
> can be justified by the evidence.
> 
> “While digital contact tracing has distinct advantages, it requires the
> right functionality – and enhanced manual tracing apps such as
> Australia’s COVIDSafe, which do not enable instantaneous notification,
> will not achieve the enhanced speed required for success.
> 
> Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19: A Primer for Policymakers was
> funded and developed by researchers and staff at the Centre for Social
> Data Analytics. <https://issr.uq.edu.au/files/14448/PolicyPrimer.pdf>
> 
> It was written by academics from the four universities: Rhema
> Vaithianathan, Matthew Ryan, Nina Anchugina, Linda Selvey, Tim Dare and
> Anna Brown.
> 


-- 
Roger Clarke                            mailto:Roger.Clarke at xamax.com.au
T: +61 2 6288 6916   http://www.xamax.com.au  http://www.rogerclarke.com

Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd      78 Sidaway St, Chapman ACT 2611 AUSTRALIA

Visiting Professor in the Faculty of Law            University of N.S.W.
Visiting Professor in Computer Science    Australian National University