[LINK] G7 And Technical Standards: Blink And You Might Have Missed The New Battleground
Kim Holburn
kim at holburn.net
Fri May 21 13:43:12 AEST 2021
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210517/09524046814/g7-technical-standards-blink-you-might-have-missed-new-battleground.shtml
>
> G7 And Technical Standards: Blink And You Might Have Missed The New Battleground
>
> <https://www.techdirt.com/search.php?tid=policy&search=Search>
>
> Policy <https://www.techdirt.com/search.php?tid=policy&search=Search>
>
>
> from the /governments-encroaching/ dept
>
> Thu, May 20th 2021 3:42pm — Konstantinos Komaitis and Dominique Lazanski
> <https://www.techdirt.com/search.php?aid=konstantinos.komaitis.and.domi&search=Search>
>
> Amid all the news about the third wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the politics behind the vaccination roll out, you might have
> missed the Ministerial Declaration
> <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/981567/G7_Digital_and_Technology_Ministerial_Declaration.pdf>
> from the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ meeting. As per tradition, the G7 Digital Ministerial provides the opportunity for
> the seven richest countries of the world to declare their commitments and vision on the type of digital future they would like to
> see. The document is non-binding but it has the tendency to provide some useful insights on the way the G7 countries view digital
> issues and their future positions in multilateral fora; it is also informative of other, more formal, multilateral processes. On
> 28 April 2021, a statement was made addressing key technology issues and opportunities including security in ICT supply chains,
> Internet safety, free data flows, electronic transferable records, digital competition and technical standards.
>
> Yes, you read that right - technical standards. In the last several years technical standards have moved from the realm of
> engineers into wider politics. News stories have been replete with China’s efforts to become a competitive force on 5G
> <https://www.ft.com/content/858d81bd-c42c-404d-b30d-0be32a097f1c>, AI and facial recognition standards
> <https://www.ft.com/content/188d86df-6e82-47eb-a134-2e1e45c777b6> and its wish to be developed internationally based on their
> national rules, culture and technology. But the public eye turned more closely to China when it was discovered that the facial
> recognition standards <https://tech.newstatesman.com/policy/chinese-firms-facial-recognition-standards> being
>
developed by China in the UN system were from countries on the US sanctions
>
> list and used by China for monitoring Uighurs
> <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20201215/10221545889/huawei-is-crafting-facial-recognition-tech-that-will-make-it-easier-chinese-government-to-target-citizens-it-doesnt-like.shtml>.
>
>
> None of this is new. For the past few years and for anyone who has been paying attention, China has been strategically positioning
> itself in various standards bodies realizing that shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar world order cannot happen unless it is
> capable of demonstrating a more strategic and competitive approach to the domination of the west. What was the tipping point,
> however, that made the seven richest countries in the world offer explicit language on standards inserted into their declaration?
> Everything seems to be pointing to the "newIP" standard proposal
> <https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2020/discussion-paper-an-analysis-of-the-new-ip-proposal-to-the-itu-t/>,
> recommending a change in the current Internet technology, that was put forward by Huawei and supported by China in the
> International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Although this new standard did not manage to pass the ITU’s study group phase, it
> did raise the eyebrows of the West. And, rightly so.
>
> Historically, Internet standards have paved their own path and have majorly managed to stay outside of politics. In one of the
> earliest Requests for Comments <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1310> (RFC), the definition of a standard was specific and narrow:
> a standard is “a specification that is stable and well-understood, is technical competent, has multiple, independent and
> interoperable implementations with operations experience, enjoys significant public support, and is recognizably useful in some or
> all parts of the Internet”.
>
> Traditionally, governments have had a hands-off approach in the development and deployment of standards related to the Internet;
> their development was part of the consensus-based, community-driven process developed and nurtured by the Internet Engineering
> Task Force (IETF) and their deployment was left to the market. A standard’s life has always depended on its utility and
> contribution to the evolution of the Internet.
>
> This seems to be the case less and less. Over the past years, governments have shown increasing interest in the development of
> standards, and have sought ways to inject themselves into Internet standardization processes. There are two distinct ways that
> this trend has emerged. First, there's China, which actively seeks to displace the current Internet infrastructure. That was clear
> in the attempt with the “newIP” proposal. China has been strategic in not directly suggesting a complete rejection of the Internet
> model; instead, its claims have been that the Internet cannot meet future technologies and needs and, therefore, a new
> infrastructure, developed and nurtured by governments, is necessary. The second trend continues to support the open,
> market-driven standards development processes, but seeks ways for governments to be more actively involved. This, so far, has
> mainly been interpreted as identifying ways to provide incentives for the creation and deployment of certain standards, often
> those deemed strategically important.
>
> Even though these approaches reflect different political and governance dimensions - China supports a top-down approach over the
> West’s bottom-up model - they do share one commonality: in both cases, politics are becoming part of the standardization process.
> This is entirely unlike the past 30 years of Internet development.
>
> This could have significant implications in the development and future of the Internet. There are benefits from the current
> structure: efficiency, agility and collaboration. The existing process ensures quick responses to problems. But, its main
> advantage is really the collective understanding that standards are driven by what is “good for the Internet”; that is, what is
> required for the Internet’s stability, resilience and integrity.
>
> This doesn’t mean that this process is perfect. Of course, it comes with its own limitations and challenges. But, even then, it is
> a tested process that has worked well for the Internet throughout most of its existence. It has worked - despite its flaws -
> because it has managed to keep political and cultural dimensions separate. Participants, irrespective of background, language, and
> political persuasion have been collaborating successfully by having *the Internet* and what's good for *it*, as their main objective.
>
> On the contrary, intergovernmental standards are driven by political differences and political motives. They are designed this
> way. This is not to say that governments should not be paying attention to the way standards are developed. But, it is crucial to
> do so in ways that do not seek to upend a model that is tested and responsive to the needs of the Internet.
>
> /Dr. Konstantinos Komaitis is the Senior Director, Policy Strategy and Development at the Internet Society./
>
> /Dominique Lazanski is the Director of Last Press Label, and a Consultant in International Internet and Cybersecurity Standards
> and Policy./
>
--
Kim Holburn
IT Network & Security Consultant
+61 404072753
mailto:kim at holburn.net aim://kimholburn
skype://kholburn - PGP Public Key on request
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