[LINK] Fwd: vip-l: Electronic votiing

[Craig Sanders]

On Thu, Nov 16, 2006 at 04:32:39PM +1100, Stewart Fist wrote:
> Surely David Goldstone's concern for the blind is solved by providing
> a single computerised (maybe touch-screen, with audio feedback - as
> Tom mentioned) which does no tabulation, but simply prints out a
> normal paper ballot that the user can then drop in the standard ballot
> box.

not exactly. unless they can read the printed ballot (which, of course,
they cant) they have no way of knowing whether what was printed actually
matches their vote. they'd have to have a sighted assistant to verify it
for them.

(i'd accept this as a tolerable compromise, though, as long as the blind
voter had the OPTION of an assistant to verify that the machine printed
their vote correctly, and each voter was advised at the time of voting
that it was the only way to ensure that the machine recorded their vote
properly).


even if the printer punched braille holes in the paper as well as
printing on it, they have no way of knowing whether the braille matches
the printed vote....and it's the printed vote which is the one that is
going to be counted. and, as has been pointed out before, not all blind
people can read braille anyway - it is a dying skill, with audio-books
being very common these days and voice synthesis getting better.



the voting machines being discussed in this thread have the same problem
- sure, it may be easier for the user to push the buttons, but there's
no way for them to know whether their vote was recorded accurately by
the machine....and, worse, because the ballots are printed remotely at
the end of the election, it has eliminated even the possibility of local
verification by an assistant.

there are now four new points where the blind voter's vote can be
tampered with:

1. at the voting machine itself - all it has to do is record a vote
inaccurately.

2. during transport to the ballot printing centre - someone can replace
the memory cards/disks/whatever or change the data on them. or just lose
them if the demographics of the booth support the "wrong" candidate.

3. at the ballot printing centre - someone (or corrupted software on the
ballot printing computer) can substitute dodgy printouts.

4. during transport back to the ballot location for counting - yet
another opportunity for substitution or theft.




> We should provide every aid possible for disabled people to function
> in as normal a way as they can -- but there is no need to sacrifice
> anything or any safeguards for the non-disabled population to provide
> this level of service.

yes, exactly my point.

unfortunately, the inherent cost of automating the electoral process is
to throw away the safeguards.

and there's no need for it, it doesn't give us anything that is worth
the risks.


craig

-- 
craig sanders <cas at taz.net.au>           (part time cyborg)