[LINK] Electronic Voting

[Craig Sanders]

On Fri, Nov 17, 2006 at 11:24:14AM +1100, Howard Lowndes wrote:
> Since we are attempting to come up with solutions, lets see if this one 
> flies:
> 
> Pre-requisites:
> Open source software throughout

open source would be a requirement in any e-voting software, but is not enough
to ensure the security and accuracy of the vote.  there are problems inherent
to e-voting that open source software can not solve, because nothing can solve
them (i.e. the fact that it transforms an open process into a black-box).


> Voter can retain token if they wish, but is advised to destroy it in the 
> adjacent shredder if they do not wish.
> 
> After the vote all scanned ballot papers are published on line.
> 
> Voters who opt to retain their token can go on line to check that their 
> vote was:
> 1. counted
> 2. counted in the manner that they wished.
> Anyone can access this on line service, but as the token has no link to 
> the voter other than the voter who has the physical token, then it 
> provides confirmation that the vote was correctly counted and is anonymous.
> 
> Idea?  Please throw the brick bats - there's got to be something I've 
> missed.  :)

two obvious problems:

1. you have to take it on trust that the token number is NOT somehow
linked to the voter's identity.

2. because it provides a way to prove how you actually voted, this
allows for vote-buying and vote-coercion.

at the moment, there is no way for someone improperly influencing
someone else's vote to know that the voter actually voted the way they
said they would. this is a Good Thing. rather than argue or risk being
sacked, kicked out of home, or beaten up, it may be just easier (and
certainly safer) to agree to the coercion but vote as they would have
anyway.


craig

-- 
craig sanders <cas at taz.net.au>           (part time cyborg)