[LINK] Resilient Broadband Network needed for Australia

[Glen Turner]

On Thu, 2008-05-08 at 13:55 +0200, Kim Holburn wrote:
> Oh, it's not all the telcos fault, there's probably another elephant  
> in the room.  VOIP calls are much harder to eavesdrop on, Skype calls  
> an order of difficulty harder again.  There are vested interests who  
> don't want VOIP as part of the infrastructure until that's sorted.  It  
> may have already happened by then though.

The government requires an Interception Capability Plan. The
technical details are left to the telco.

Most SIP-based networks meet the interception requirement by
routing intercepted calls through a Session Border Controller
and using it to duplicate the call data. This requires the
SIP call router (a "SIP proxy") to have a small additional
capability (mainly auditing, so that you can demonstrate
that each interception has a warrant).

The SBC routes the interception stream to a SIP terminal, to
which you attach a PSTN phone line which the intercepting
agency can call and record in their usual fashion.

Non-intercepted calls don't need to go through the SBC (although
there are other good reasons to do that, such as limiting misuse
of your voice QoS class).