[LINK] FLoods taking out banking infrastructure

[Stilgherrian]

On 13/01/2011, at 7:53 PM, Marghanita da Cruz wrote:
> Brendan wrote:
> <snip>
>> If it is a failure of a secondary nature then so be it - "no electricity" shouldn't cut it as they should have on site generators, but perhaps a problem with connectivity to/from the site sounds more plausible?  A *DR site* which is taken out by the same flood as the primary seems to me a failure in planning. 
> <snip>
> 
> It is more an issue of the scope of a DR Strategy rather 
> than site. The most effective approach is to have multiple 
> operational sites - that way, if one goes down the service 
> is still available but at reduced capacity.

And links. Sites are useless if links go down. And sites and safe locations A, B and C are useless is links to customers pass via not-safe location D.

In case someone hasn't already mentioned it, there's also a reasonableness factor here. Do we really need to fret is something fails for a few hours in a once-a-century event? Perhaps there are more important things to focus on.

Stil


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