[LINK] The Internet Filter - Time to Getup!?

Sun Jul 10 13:17:45 AEST 2011

At 12:03 +1000 10/7/11, Kim Holburn wrote:
>via slashdot:
>http://delimiter.com.au/2011/07/09/five-disturbing-things-about-the-interpol-filter/
>>  Five disturbing things about the Interpol filter

Shouldn't we be encouraging Getup! to campaign for a consumer boycott 
of Telstra and Optus ISP services, unless and until they remove the 
blocks?

Such a campaign has to avoid being tarred with the pro-porn brush.

It has to be made clear that the problems are:
-   it's a general-purpose censorship tool
-   it's not subject to control by the public, but by faceless bureaucrats

At 12:03 +1000 10/7/11, Kim Holburn wrote:
>via slashdot:
>http://delimiter.com.au/2011/07/09/five-disturbing-things-about-the-interpol-filter/
>
>>  Five disturbing things about the Interpol filter
>>
>>
>>  opinion This month, Australia gets its first mandatory Internet 
>>filtering scheme, courtesy of a project which is seeing the 
>>nation's largest ISPs Telstra and Optus block their users from 
>>visiting a 'worst of the worst' list of child pornography sites 
>>defined by international agency Interpol. But the project hasn't 
>>exactly come up smelling like roses. Here's five things we find 
>>disturbing about the whole thing.
>>
>>
>>  1. Telcos aren't informing users
>>
>>  Telstra's implementation of the filter went live last week. 
>>However, to our knowledge, Telstra hasn't yet informed its millions 
>>of  customers that their Internet connections are being filtered 
>>for a blacklist of sites. There has been no mass customer emails 
>>that we know of, no press releases, and the telco only confirmed 
>>its blacklist filter had gone live when we asked it late on Friday 
>>night last week.
>>
>>  Furthermore, the telco does not appear to have modified its end 
>>user agreement to include a section about filtering, so that new 
>>customers know what to expect.
>>
>>  2. There is no civilian oversight
>>
>>  You would expect that if millions of Australians are having their 
>>Internet connections filtered for a blacklist of sites, that there 
>>would be an independent government agency overseeing the process - 
>>such as the Australian Communications and Media Authority. Not so 
>>with the Interpol filter scheme.
>>
>>  The scheme was developed by industry group the Internet Industry 
>>Association, along with ISPs like Telstra and Optus and law 
>>enforcement groups such as the Australian Federal Police and 
>>Interpol itself. Those who are curious about how the whole filter 
>>process works currently have to enquire about the matter to one of 
>>these bodies.
>>
>>  Out of those groups, only the IIA has been forthcoming with 
>>details about the intricate workings of the filter over the past 
>>several weeks since the scheme was revealed. And the IIA is not 
>>directly answerable to the public - only its members, which are 
>>mainly ISPs.
>>
>>  3. The law is unclear
>>
>>  The legal mechanism under which the filter is being introduced is 
>>Section 313 of the Telecommunications Act. Under the Act, the 
>>Australian Federal Police is allowed to issue notices to telcos 
>>asking for reasonable assistance in upholding the law. It is 
>>believed the AFP has issued such notices to Telstra and Optus to 
>>ask them to filter the Interpol blacklist of sites.
>>
>>  However, other ISPs such as iiNet, Internode, TPG and Exetel 
>>appear to be uncertain as to where precisely they would stand if 
>>the AFP issued such a notice to them. Would they be forced to 
>>implement a filter against their wishes? Would they even be able to 
>>publicly disclose that they had received a notice? Is ISP filtering 
>>itself actually currently illegal? Right now, nobody knows.
>>
>>  4. The potential for scope creep is strong
>>
>>  Section 313 of the Telecommunications Act does not specifically 
>>deal with child pornography. In fact, it only requires that ISPs 
>>give government officers and authorities (such as police) 
>>reasonable assistance in upholding the law.
>>
>>  Because of this, there appears to be nothing to stop the 
>>Australian Federal Police from issuing much wider notices under the 
>>Act to ISPs, requesting they block other categories of content 
>>beyond child pornography, which are also technically illegal in 
>>Australia ('Refused Classification') but not blocked yet. A number 
>>of sites which were on the borderlines of legality - such as sites 
>>espousing a change of legislation regarding euthanasia - were 
>>believed to be included as part of the blacklist associated with 
>>the Federal Government's much wider mandatory filtering policy. 
>>Could the AFP request these be blocked as well?
>>
>>  5. There is no open and transparent appeal process
>>
>>  Right now, if a web site is wrongfully included on Interpol's 
>>blacklist of sites, there is only one way to appeal and get it 
>>removed - through Interpol or associated law enforcement agencies 
>>such as the Australian Federal Police. And Interpol doesn't appear 
>>to want to discuss the matter very much. Its 'complaints procedure' 
>>page states:
>>
>>  "Interpol will not be in position to engage in dialogue with 
>>complainants, nor will they receive any information on whether the 
>>domain has been removed from the list of blocked domains or not."
>>
>>  Great.
>>
>>  In contrast, the Federal Government has pledged to introduce much 
>>more transparent review processes into its much wider Internet 
>>filtering scheme. For example, its blacklist will be reviewed 
>>annually by an independent expert, feature "clear " avenues for 
>>appeal of classification decisions and a policy will be put in 
>>place to allow for all decisions to be reviewed by the existing 
>>Classification Review Board.
>>
>>  Now, we don't want to be too harsh about the IIA's Interpol 
>>filtering scheme as it is being implemented by Telstra and Optus. 
>>It is quite hard for a site to get on Interpol's blacklist, with 
>>multiple agencies having to authorise additions, and there is a 
>>certain attraction around the idea that we're only blocking the 
>>"worst of the worst" sites containing child pornography, instead of 
>>a much wider category of content. In addition, it doesn't seem as 
>>if there have been many instances internationally where 
>>implementation of the list has caused problems.
>>
>>  However, we are mystified as to why the IIA, Telstra, Optus and 
>>the AFP are displaying such a lack of transparency in their 
>>implementation of the scheme. We are talking about a filtering 
>>scheme here which is being implemented behind closed doors, with 
>>little notification to customers, with no civilian oversight, an 
>>unclear legal framework, the potential for scope creep and a 
>>limited and secretive appeals process overseen by the agency which 
>>drew up the list to start with.
>>
>>  Come on, Australia. Is this the best we can do?
>
>
>
>--
>Kim Holburn
>IT Network & Security Consultant
>T: +61 2 61402408  M: +61 404072753
>mailto:kim at holburn.net  aim://kimholburn
>skype://kholburn - PGP Public Key on request
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