[LINK] RFI: Joint Select Ctee on Cybersafety

Tom Koltai tomk at unwired.com.au
Mon Mar 14 15:36:44 AEDT 2011



> -----Original Message-----
> From: link-bounces at mailman.anu.edu.au 
> [mailto:link-bounces at mailman.anu.edu.au] On Behalf Of 
> stephen at melbpc.org.au
> Sent: Monday, 14 March 2011 2:13 PM
> To: link at anu.edu.au
> Subject: Re: [LINK] RFI: Joint Select Ctee on Cybersafety
> 
> 
> Roger Clarke wrote:
> 
> > ...  pressure-points worth considering
> 
> 
> Though NOT suggesting that such a thing be done, perhaps 
> pollies should be aware that a personal, "filter backlash 
> effect" might happen, as has occurred frequently for example 
> regards China's Great Wall and Wikileaks.
> 
> I would NOT wish such a reaction on anyone, but it's a fact 
> they happen: 
> 
> 'Great firewall' of China can't shield its creator from hate mail
> 
> PTI | Feb 19, 2011, 06.56am IST
> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Great-firewall
> -of-China-
> cant-shield-its-creator-from-hate-mail/articleshow/7525829.cms>

So possibly, not the sort of thing that a career minded politician would
want to have associated with his name..
Or in fact the career minded politicians Prime Minister...

><SNIP>

> He claimed that GFW is a "common phenomenon around the world" and in 
> about 180 countries including the US. 

I highly doubt that.
There would appear to be a global interdiction industry that
specifically attacks and sql injects [malware] blog sites where the
content is not favourable to persons who have the money to pay for such
interdiction...

I think the term used is "Reputation management"

If the GFW was as widespread, I doubt that Wikileaks would have been
able to cause such a stir.

I don't doubt that the Chinese Government and Fang Binxing could make a
tidy sum selling a GFW "cloud" service <grin>, however, circumvention
via various forms of frequency enhanced synchronous multicast with PVC's
would appear to be relatively trivial so I can't actually see the point
of a great wall.

Iran had a great wall in 1996, it's integrity lasted approximately 11
minutes.
The penetration of any TCP-IP deny-all all is always possible using
lower layers.

On the other hand, a layer one GFW would work.... I can see it in
operation now... 500 million RTTY Morse operators transmitting packets
using semaphore [literary licence... It's a joke] through a glass window
with 500 million operators on the other side of the glass rey-keying the
data...

Might work. Let me see, would that include one time pad use... Oh, it
wouldn't. Shame about that.

Tom






 










More information about the Link mailing list