[LINK] Google's Driverless Car Is Worth Trillions
Jim Birch
planetjim at gmail.com
Tue Jan 29 12:41:14 AEDT 2013
There's an inverse parallel result set in cognitive psychology where the
presumed rational conscious human actor has been demonstrated to be to a
major extent illusory, despite our intuition to the contrary. We are have
a range of built-in biases including serial overestimation of our
capabilities, we believe our recalled memories when they have a large
imagined component, and key components of our decision-making processes are
unconscious. However, we believe we are rational decision makers unlike
robots that are dumb programmable machines of dubious reliability.
You might reasonably argue that the whole legal framework of responsibility
is more of a operational mythology than grounded in reality. Who would you
believe in a court of law, a human driver or the robot he hit?
Jim
Jim Birch
e: planetjim at gmail.com
m: 04 1243 1243
On 28 January 2013 22:28, Jan Whitaker <jwhit at melbpc.org.au> wrote:
> At 10:08 PM 28/01/2013, Kim Holburn you wrote:
> > > Would it be better to always have a responsible driver ready to take
> over?
> >
> >It's like that old law that you must have someone someone walking in
> >front of every horseless carriage with a red flag.
>
> Another related situation: robot trains coming up from a proposed new
> Western Port shipping terminal in Victoria through dense population
> areas before they reach their final destination.
>
> Should be interesting lawyer's feast as soon as a car is hit at a
> level crossing.....
>
>
> Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
> jwhit at janwhitaker.com
> blog: http://janwhitaker.com/jansblog/
> business: http://www.janwhitaker.com
>
> Our truest response to the irrationality of the world is to paint or
> sing or write, for only in such response do we find truth.
> ~Madeline L'Engle, writer
>
> _ __________________ _
> _______________________________________________
> Link mailing list
> Link at mailman.anu.edu.au
> http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link
>
More information about the Link
mailing list